Facts matter - and the facts are clear. The South Orient/Texas-Pacifico rehabilitation project is in fact not fully funded. It is a matter of public record that certain portions of the project are funded through Federal FAST grants, administered by TXDOT, while significant portions - roughly 162 miles of required repair lack full funding. However, that is largely irrelevant, as MMEX via its proposed Phase I project would be unable to produce any products usable in Mexico.
If it were real, and ever built, the Phase I rudimentary topping unit, as (incompletely) permitted can produce three intermediate output streams:
- ATB, or Atmospheric Tank Bottoms (aka. “resid”).
- AGO, or Atmospheric Gas-Oil, a medium distillate, sometimes known as “straight run diesel”
- LGO, or Light Gas-Oil, a lighter fraction that contains what’s colloquially known as “naphtha,” along with kerosene, ethane, propane, and butane
None of those intermediate streams have any direct market use - all must be further refined to be consumed as fuel products, or used as feedstock. That processing is done in a real, complex refinery, not an imaginary “refinery” as proposed by MMEX.
ATB requires vacuum processing, and further complex processing, i.e. some form of cracking.
AGO requires hydro forming, stabilization, and stripping.
LGO requires stripping, depropanizing, demethanizing, deethanizing, an reforming.
All three streams require desulfurization. MMEX’s Phase I proposed system has none of these capabilities.
Further, MMEX and its illustrious partners “forgot” critical process capability, including desalting, pre-flash, and other critical loops including steam, critical pump-around, and redundant/bypass heat exchange. The immediate impact of these “forgotten” critical process elements was a $20-million error in the cost forecast, escalating MMEX’s required budget from “less than $49-million” to more than $70-million.
In reality, MMEX tried, as part of its charade, to use the TCEQ Permit By Rule (PBR) administrative permit approach to deceive investors. MMEX would be unable to meet the PBR thresholds for a Type O AQP if the required critical process elements had been in place (or get added later). Thus, the current Type O AQP is worthless - there is no process for amending it. This in turn leads to the necessity for MMEX to pursue full New Source Review (NSR), which costs millions, and takes from 18 - 24 months, even for a competent company to execute.
MMEX is a multi-dimensional failure, even if one gives it the benefit of doubt - in reality, it doesn’t matter, as MMEX is only a mediocre share-selling scheme.
As if MMEX needs more nails in its coffin, the problems with its proposed primary market are manifold. Mexico’s refining infrastructure is aged, and failing. Mexico suffers rampant hydrocarbon theft. The institutions responsible for all this are bankrupt, and corrupt. There is no market for ATB, AGO, or LGO in Mexico, even if MMEX had a way to transport it there. Here is one of dozens of sources for that information:
https://wolfstreet.com/2019/01/01/mexico-new-...8YkGl4gu-s
If it were real, and ever built, the Phase I rudimentary topping unit, as (incompletely) permitted can produce three intermediate output streams:
- ATB, or Atmospheric Tank Bottoms (aka. “resid”).
- AGO, or Atmospheric Gas-Oil, a medium distillate, sometimes known as “straight run diesel”
- LGO, or Light Gas-Oil, a lighter fraction that contains what’s colloquially known as “naphtha,” along with kerosene, ethane, propane, and butane
None of those intermediate streams have any direct market use - all must be further refined to be consumed as fuel products, or used as feedstock. That processing is done in a real, complex refinery, not an imaginary “refinery” as proposed by MMEX.
ATB requires vacuum processing, and further complex processing, i.e. some form of cracking.
AGO requires hydro forming, stabilization, and stripping.
LGO requires stripping, depropanizing, demethanizing, deethanizing, an reforming.
All three streams require desulfurization. MMEX’s Phase I proposed system has none of these capabilities.
Further, MMEX and its illustrious partners “forgot” critical process capability, including desalting, pre-flash, and other critical loops including steam, critical pump-around, and redundant/bypass heat exchange. The immediate impact of these “forgotten” critical process elements was a $20-million error in the cost forecast, escalating MMEX’s required budget from “less than $49-million” to more than $70-million.
In reality, MMEX tried, as part of its charade, to use the TCEQ Permit By Rule (PBR) administrative permit approach to deceive investors. MMEX would be unable to meet the PBR thresholds for a Type O AQP if the required critical process elements had been in place (or get added later). Thus, the current Type O AQP is worthless - there is no process for amending it. This in turn leads to the necessity for MMEX to pursue full New Source Review (NSR), which costs millions, and takes from 18 - 24 months, even for a competent company to execute.
MMEX is a multi-dimensional failure, even if one gives it the benefit of doubt - in reality, it doesn’t matter, as MMEX is only a mediocre share-selling scheme.
As if MMEX needs more nails in its coffin, the problems with its proposed primary market are manifold. Mexico’s refining infrastructure is aged, and failing. Mexico suffers rampant hydrocarbon theft. The institutions responsible for all this are bankrupt, and corrupt. There is no market for ATB, AGO, or LGO in Mexico, even if MMEX had a way to transport it there. Here is one of dozens of sources for that information:
https://wolfstreet.com/2019/01/01/mexico-new-...8YkGl4gu-s
