Agree on the .75 cut, but why would it stop there
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Posted On: 08/05/2024 2:04:50 PM
Re: Chasing Stars #120729
Agree on the .75 cut, but why would it stop there if the Fed feared a recession?
Inflation is way down from a year ago and it IS a worldwide problem among ALL of the nations in which Biden was not the president.
Downplaying he pandemic was not the wisest of moves either. Trump could have gotten behind the vaxxes when they were launched instead of waiting a full year to tell his supporters to get them, for which he was roundly booed in the venue where he said that.
Trump supporters suffered disproportionately from Covid, both pre and post vax availability. https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/covid-19/political...vid-deaths
https://gfmag.com/data/economic-data/worlds-h...ion-rates/
The most immediate inflation-fighting tool in the hands of policymakers is for the central bank to raise interest rates. Doing so dampens lending and thereby the overall economic activity that drives price increases. But sometimes the cure can be worse than the disease—raising interest rates at the wrong time or to the wrong level can trigger a recession, so central bankers tend to tread cautiously. However, this caution may have hamstrung the kind of bold action that was necessary to successfully confront and contain the unprecedented, dramatic surge in inflation across the globe in the aftermath of the 2020 pandemic.
Let’s rewind. In 2020—at the onset and during the worst phase of the pandemic—the increase in prices was relatively small. But a sudden, steep climb began in early 2021 with the easing of lockdowns and partial restoration of normal economic activity. Encouraged by the almost concomitant vaccine rollout in many countries, central bankers around the world were perhaps overly optimistic: they often described the first spikes in inflation as just “blips” bound to disappear soon.
They were certainly right about the main reason for those blips: Covid-19 had caused serious disruption to the global economy—supply-chain bottlenecks meant that demands for what consumers and firms wanted and needed could not be met which prompted demand to far exceed supply, driving prices upwards.
What they could not imagine is that new variants of the virus would continue to bubble up, that so many people would resist or outright reject mask mandates and vaccines, and that the global distribution of vaccines would be so unequal and uneven. Sparked by a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic, episodic supply chain disruptions became endemic.
But there was also a second reason why central bankers tended to downplay the threat of inflation. The ability to reassure consumers and businesses that things are—and will be—fine is, in itself, a crucial part of their job description because the belief that prices will continue rising becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as businesses raise prices to get ahead of impending cost increases. A rise in prices is often an effect of a rise in fear as much as it is an effect of rising costs.
Inflation is way down from a year ago and it IS a worldwide problem among ALL of the nations in which Biden was not the president.
Downplaying he pandemic was not the wisest of moves either. Trump could have gotten behind the vaxxes when they were launched instead of waiting a full year to tell his supporters to get them, for which he was roundly booed in the venue where he said that.
Trump supporters suffered disproportionately from Covid, both pre and post vax availability. https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/covid-19/political...vid-deaths
https://gfmag.com/data/economic-data/worlds-h...ion-rates/
The most immediate inflation-fighting tool in the hands of policymakers is for the central bank to raise interest rates. Doing so dampens lending and thereby the overall economic activity that drives price increases. But sometimes the cure can be worse than the disease—raising interest rates at the wrong time or to the wrong level can trigger a recession, so central bankers tend to tread cautiously. However, this caution may have hamstrung the kind of bold action that was necessary to successfully confront and contain the unprecedented, dramatic surge in inflation across the globe in the aftermath of the 2020 pandemic.
Let’s rewind. In 2020—at the onset and during the worst phase of the pandemic—the increase in prices was relatively small. But a sudden, steep climb began in early 2021 with the easing of lockdowns and partial restoration of normal economic activity. Encouraged by the almost concomitant vaccine rollout in many countries, central bankers around the world were perhaps overly optimistic: they often described the first spikes in inflation as just “blips” bound to disappear soon.
They were certainly right about the main reason for those blips: Covid-19 had caused serious disruption to the global economy—supply-chain bottlenecks meant that demands for what consumers and firms wanted and needed could not be met which prompted demand to far exceed supply, driving prices upwards.
What they could not imagine is that new variants of the virus would continue to bubble up, that so many people would resist or outright reject mask mandates and vaccines, and that the global distribution of vaccines would be so unequal and uneven. Sparked by a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic, episodic supply chain disruptions became endemic.
But there was also a second reason why central bankers tended to downplay the threat of inflation. The ability to reassure consumers and businesses that things are—and will be—fine is, in itself, a crucial part of their job description because the belief that prices will continue rising becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy as businesses raise prices to get ahead of impending cost increases. A rise in prices is often an effect of a rise in fear as much as it is an effect of rising costs.
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