Part 3
By 2021, Amazon was rolling out products from its moonshot lab, including a kids videoconferencing device and virtual travel program. That spring, about five years after Helton was recruited, the company launched Amazon Care. The service looked a lot like the original pitch. After downloading the Care app, patients could start a text chat with a nurse or request a virtual visit or in-home care. There was one big departure, though: You couldn’t simply see a doctor. Your employer had to sign up first. Care’s first business development chief, Nicole Bell, had recommended selling the new service to corporate benefits departments. Amazon, the would-be disruptor, would go through the existing system.
The first customer was Amazon itself. Feedback from patients was almost universally positive. Jassy, who had expressed some skepticism about the service’s business model, loved it, according to someone briefed on his reaction. But Amazon had a hard time persuading other companies. Corporations tend to buy health care for their employees as part of a laborious, years-long process. The upshot: Amazon had arrived on the scene with a product that looked a lot like existing telehealth services, and few companies were willing to upset established relationships for a newcomer with no track record.
The service did manage a few big signings. Precor, a Peloton fitness equipment subsidiary, was the first outside customer. Months later, the team celebrated when they signed Hilton, the hotel chain, and Care Medical staffed up on nurses to handle an expected rush of new patients. But business remained slow, according to former Amazon Care nurses. Some potential corporate customers backed out because Amazon wouldn’t let them end the contract if the service didn’t meet usage goals. Others wanted proof that Care lowered costs. Strikingly for a company that prides itself on a ruthless adherence to data, Amazon salespeople had little empirical evidence to offer, only glowing testimonials from its own employees.
Amazon Care slowly picked up corporate customers. But clinicians and Care salespeople say few employees from those companies were actually using the service. An Amazon Care nurse based in the Midwest says she would go hours without seeing a patient and was essentially paid to do nothing.
By then, Amazon was mulling an entirely different plan. Health services chief Lindsay had for years frequented One Medical, which courts urban professionals with sleek doctor’s offices, an app and an Amazon-like mantra to keep patients happy. While the chain had never turned a profit, it boasted 8,500 corporate clients, including Alphabet. “We have always sort of kept our eyes open and, you know, I guess one thing led to another,” said Lindsay, who suggested Amazon acquire the company.
The One Medical deal was a surprise—not least to Amazon Care employees. Many had already been fretting about their futures. Helton had left months earlier, replaced by a Kindle veteran named Aaron Martin, who’d previously been chief digital officer at Providence, a health system headquartered in the Seattle area. Martin soon began preaching profitability, prompting some of his underlings to suspect that Amazon Care was in trouble. A few months later, they learned via pre-recorded video that the business was closing. Care shut down in December. About 400 people in Washington state lost their jobs, along with hundreds more elsewhere.
By 2021, Amazon was rolling out products from its moonshot lab, including a kids videoconferencing device and virtual travel program. That spring, about five years after Helton was recruited, the company launched Amazon Care. The service looked a lot like the original pitch. After downloading the Care app, patients could start a text chat with a nurse or request a virtual visit or in-home care. There was one big departure, though: You couldn’t simply see a doctor. Your employer had to sign up first. Care’s first business development chief, Nicole Bell, had recommended selling the new service to corporate benefits departments. Amazon, the would-be disruptor, would go through the existing system.
The first customer was Amazon itself. Feedback from patients was almost universally positive. Jassy, who had expressed some skepticism about the service’s business model, loved it, according to someone briefed on his reaction. But Amazon had a hard time persuading other companies. Corporations tend to buy health care for their employees as part of a laborious, years-long process. The upshot: Amazon had arrived on the scene with a product that looked a lot like existing telehealth services, and few companies were willing to upset established relationships for a newcomer with no track record.
The service did manage a few big signings. Precor, a Peloton fitness equipment subsidiary, was the first outside customer. Months later, the team celebrated when they signed Hilton, the hotel chain, and Care Medical staffed up on nurses to handle an expected rush of new patients. But business remained slow, according to former Amazon Care nurses. Some potential corporate customers backed out because Amazon wouldn’t let them end the contract if the service didn’t meet usage goals. Others wanted proof that Care lowered costs. Strikingly for a company that prides itself on a ruthless adherence to data, Amazon salespeople had little empirical evidence to offer, only glowing testimonials from its own employees.
Amazon Care slowly picked up corporate customers. But clinicians and Care salespeople say few employees from those companies were actually using the service. An Amazon Care nurse based in the Midwest says she would go hours without seeing a patient and was essentially paid to do nothing.
By then, Amazon was mulling an entirely different plan. Health services chief Lindsay had for years frequented One Medical, which courts urban professionals with sleek doctor’s offices, an app and an Amazon-like mantra to keep patients happy. While the chain had never turned a profit, it boasted 8,500 corporate clients, including Alphabet. “We have always sort of kept our eyes open and, you know, I guess one thing led to another,” said Lindsay, who suggested Amazon acquire the company.
The One Medical deal was a surprise—not least to Amazon Care employees. Many had already been fretting about their futures. Helton had left months earlier, replaced by a Kindle veteran named Aaron Martin, who’d previously been chief digital officer at Providence, a health system headquartered in the Seattle area. Martin soon began preaching profitability, prompting some of his underlings to suspect that Amazon Care was in trouble. A few months later, they learned via pre-recorded video that the business was closing. Care shut down in December. About 400 people in Washington state lost their jobs, along with hundreds more elsewhere.
