fyi...
Translation: Unsettled = "Failures to Deliver" = Loan = Debt!!!
"At the same time, the incidence of settlement risk has remained obstinately high , and FX swap positions point to a growing volume of “missing” US dollar debt."
pg15
"A key source of vulnerability is the dollar borrowing embedded in foreign
exchange markets. Unlike most other types of derivatives, FX swaps, forwards and
currency swaps involve the exchange of principal, and thus give rise to payment
obligations equal to the full amount of the contract. Globally, dollar obligations
amounted to over $80 trillion in mid-2022. Importantly, since these obligations are
reported off-balance sheet, standard debt statistics fail to capture them . Such dollar
debt is, in this sense, “missing”.
pg 16
Out of sight, however, should not mean out of mind. FX swap markets are
vulnerable to funding squeezes, given the short-term maturity of the off-balance
sheet obligations . In the Great Financial Crisis and the market turmoil of March 2020,
swap markets emerged as flash points, prompting extraordinary policy actions in the
form of central bank swap lines. In both episodes, policymakers were operating with
little information about the scale and geography of the dollar rollover needs.
pg 17
By contrast, for currencies with FX controls, FX swaps account for a very
small share of derivatives trading and are predominantly traded onshore between
residents . Instead, derivatives trading is concentrated in forwards, especially nondeliverable forwards (NDFs) traded offshore. NDFs do not require an exchange of currencies; they settle in the same currency, typically in US dollars . For a few currencies, FX controls permit limited deliverability outside the issuing country, which boosts their FX swap and overall trading. For example, this is the case for CNY, which can be cleared and settled in Hong Kong SAR and a few other major financial centres in the so-called CNH market.
pg 55
This off-balance sheet dollar debt poses particular policy challenges because standard debt statistics miss it. The lack of direct information makes it harder for policymakers to anticipate the scale and geography of dollar rollover needs. Thus, in times of crisis, policies to restore the smooth flow of short-term dollars in the financial
system (eg central bank swap lines) are set in a fog. The missing dollar debt from FX swaps/forwards and currency swaps is huge, adding to the vulnerabilities created by on-balance sheet dollar debts of non-US borrowers. It has reached $26 trillion for non-banks outside the United States, double their on-balance sheet debt.
Dollar dominance is striking in this FX market segment, greater than in any other
aspect of dollar use. As a vehicle currency, the US dollar is on one side of 88% of
outstanding positions – or $85 trillion.
pg 68
The very short maturity of the typical FX swap/forward creates potential for
liquidity squeezes. Almost four fifths of outstanding amounts at end-June 2022 in
Graph 1.B matured in less than one year. Data from the April 2022 Triennial Survey
show not only that instruments maturing within a week accounted for some 70% of
FX swaps turnover, but also that those maturing overnight accounted for more than
30%. When dollar lenders step back from the FX swap market, the squeeze follows immediately (Correa et al (2020))
Despite their long-term foreign
currency assets, the likes of Dutch pension funds or Japanese life insurers roll over
swaps every month or quarter, running a maturity mismatch
pg 69
Off-balance sheet dollar debt may remain out of sight and out of mind, but only until the next time dollar funding liquidity is squeezed . Then, the hidden leverage and maturity mismatch in pension funds’ and insurance companies’ portfolios – generally supposed to be long-only – could pose a policy challenge. And policies to restore the flow of dollars would still be set in a fog.
pg 71
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2212.pdf
If I remember correctly Alberto Navarro: Treasurer/Director on the CRGP website but not listed on the Nevada SOS site points back to a Hong Kong Trust. This may explain a possible hijacking or protection of assets!
Two markets cannot exist that take custody of US property and settle these transactions outside of its financial system!
$13
$CRGP
Translation: Unsettled = "Failures to Deliver" = Loan = Debt!!!
"At the same time, the incidence of settlement risk has remained obstinately high , and FX swap positions point to a growing volume of “missing” US dollar debt."
pg15
"A key source of vulnerability is the dollar borrowing embedded in foreign
exchange markets. Unlike most other types of derivatives, FX swaps, forwards and
currency swaps involve the exchange of principal, and thus give rise to payment
obligations equal to the full amount of the contract. Globally, dollar obligations
amounted to over $80 trillion in mid-2022. Importantly, since these obligations are
reported off-balance sheet, standard debt statistics fail to capture them . Such dollar
debt is, in this sense, “missing”.
pg 16
Out of sight, however, should not mean out of mind. FX swap markets are
vulnerable to funding squeezes, given the short-term maturity of the off-balance
sheet obligations . In the Great Financial Crisis and the market turmoil of March 2020,
swap markets emerged as flash points, prompting extraordinary policy actions in the
form of central bank swap lines. In both episodes, policymakers were operating with
little information about the scale and geography of the dollar rollover needs.
pg 17
By contrast, for currencies with FX controls, FX swaps account for a very
small share of derivatives trading and are predominantly traded onshore between
residents . Instead, derivatives trading is concentrated in forwards, especially nondeliverable forwards (NDFs) traded offshore. NDFs do not require an exchange of currencies; they settle in the same currency, typically in US dollars . For a few currencies, FX controls permit limited deliverability outside the issuing country, which boosts their FX swap and overall trading. For example, this is the case for CNY, which can be cleared and settled in Hong Kong SAR and a few other major financial centres in the so-called CNH market.
pg 55
This off-balance sheet dollar debt poses particular policy challenges because standard debt statistics miss it. The lack of direct information makes it harder for policymakers to anticipate the scale and geography of dollar rollover needs. Thus, in times of crisis, policies to restore the smooth flow of short-term dollars in the financial
system (eg central bank swap lines) are set in a fog. The missing dollar debt from FX swaps/forwards and currency swaps is huge, adding to the vulnerabilities created by on-balance sheet dollar debts of non-US borrowers. It has reached $26 trillion for non-banks outside the United States, double their on-balance sheet debt.
Dollar dominance is striking in this FX market segment, greater than in any other
aspect of dollar use. As a vehicle currency, the US dollar is on one side of 88% of
outstanding positions – or $85 trillion.
pg 68
The very short maturity of the typical FX swap/forward creates potential for
liquidity squeezes. Almost four fifths of outstanding amounts at end-June 2022 in
Graph 1.B matured in less than one year. Data from the April 2022 Triennial Survey
show not only that instruments maturing within a week accounted for some 70% of
FX swaps turnover, but also that those maturing overnight accounted for more than
30%. When dollar lenders step back from the FX swap market, the squeeze follows immediately (Correa et al (2020))
Despite their long-term foreign
currency assets, the likes of Dutch pension funds or Japanese life insurers roll over
swaps every month or quarter, running a maturity mismatch
pg 69
Off-balance sheet dollar debt may remain out of sight and out of mind, but only until the next time dollar funding liquidity is squeezed . Then, the hidden leverage and maturity mismatch in pension funds’ and insurance companies’ portfolios – generally supposed to be long-only – could pose a policy challenge. And policies to restore the flow of dollars would still be set in a fog.
pg 71
https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2212.pdf
Quote:Hong Kong is one of China's special administrative regions (SARs). An SAR is a relatively autonomous regions within the People's Republic of China that maintain separate legal, administrative, and judicial systems from the rest of the country.
If I remember correctly Alberto Navarro: Treasurer/Director on the CRGP website but not listed on the Nevada SOS site points back to a Hong Kong Trust. This may explain a possible hijacking or protection of assets!
Two markets cannot exist that take custody of US property and settle these transactions outside of its financial system!
$13
$CRGP
2
Calissio Resources Group, Inc. (CRGP) Stock Research Links
U.S. Constitution
"The Preamble
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Oath
"I solemnly swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America"
The Flag
"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
"The Preamble
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Oath
"I solemnly swear to support and defend the Constitution of the United States of America"
The Flag
"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."
Quote:If the broker-dealer fails to deliver for 13 days, the regulation imposes a “close out” duty to purchase and deliver securities “of like kind and quantity.”
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/20...ify%20wall
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/m...v-manning/
