Homeland Threat Assessment U.S.
Department of Homeland Secruity
Page 17
• Anti-government and/or anti-authority
violent extremists are likely to be
emboldened by a perceived success
exploiting otherwise peaceful protest
movements and concealing violent tactics.
Violent Extremism in the United States.
The primary terrorist threat inside the United States
will stem from lone offenders and small cells of
individuals, including Domestic Violent Extremists6
(DVEs) and foreign terrorist-inspired Homegrown
Violent Extremists7
(HVEs). Some U.S.-based violent
extremists have capitalized on increased social
and political tensions in 2020, which will drive an
elevated threat environment at least through early
2021. Violent extremists will continue to target
individuals or institutions that represent symbols
of their grievances, as well as grievances based on
political affiliation or perceived policy positions.
The domestic situation surrounding the COVID-19
pandemic creates an environment that could
accelerate some individuals’ mobilization to
targeted violence or radicalization to terrorism.
Social distancing may lead to social isolation, which
is associated with depression, increased anxiety,
and social alienation. Similarly, work disruptions,
including unexpected unemployment and layoffs,
can also increase risk factors associated with
radicalization to violence and willingness to engage
in acts of targeted violence.
• Violent extremist media almost certainly will
spread violent extremist ideologies, especially
via social media, that encourage violence and
influence action within the United States.
• Violent extremists will continue their efforts to
exploit public fears associated with COVID-19
and social grievances driving lawful protests to
incite violence, intimidate targets, and promote
their violent extremist ideologies.
• Simple tactics—such as vehicle ramming, small
arms, edged weapons, arson, and rudimentary
improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—probably
will be most common. However, lone offenders
could employ more sophisticated means, to
include advanced and/or high-consequence
IEDs and using crude chemical, biological, and
radiological materials.
• While ISIS and other Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) have called for attacks in
the West using “all available means,” biologicalfocused attempts would likely involve crudely
produced toxins and poisons. Similarly, during
the COVID-19 outbreak, domestic extremists
have called for the spread of the SARS-CoV-2
virus through unsophisticated means. While
significant expertise and infrastructure
limits the threat by low-level actors, even
rudimentary actions can result in economically
significant costs and incite fear without a
corresponding risk to health.
Some DVEs and other violent actors8
might
target events related to the 2020 Presidential
campaigns, the election itself, election results,
or the post-election period. Such actors could
mobilize quickly to threaten or engage in violence.
Violence related to government efforts to mitigate
the COVID-19 pandemic and amidst otherwise
ongoing lawful protests has exacerbated the typical
6 Domestic Violent Extremist (DVE): An individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign
terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of
political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be
constitutionally protected.
7
Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE): A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged
in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives
promoted by a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), but is acting independently of direction by an FTO. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage
in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.
18 Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity
election-season threat environment.
• Some DVEs have heightened their attention
to election- or campaign-related activities,
candidates’ public statements, and policy issues
connected to specific candidates, judging from
domestic terrorism plots since 2018 targeting
individuals based on their actual or perceived
political affiliations.
• Open-air, publicly accessible parts of physical
election infrastructure, such as campaignassociated mass gatherings, polling places, and
voter registration events, would be the most
likely flashpoints for potential violence.
Among DVEs, racially and ethnically motivated
violent extremists—specifically white supremacist
extremists9
(WSEs)—will remain the most persistent
and lethal threat in the Homeland. Spikes in
other DVE threats probably will depend on
political or social issues that often mobilize other
ideological actors to violence, such as immigration,
environmental, and police-related policy issues.
• WSEs have demonstrated longstanding intent to
target racial and religious minorities, members
of the LGBTQ+ community, politicians, and those
they believe promote multi-culturalism and
globalization at the expense of the WSE identity.
Since 2018, they have conducted more lethal
attacks in the United States than any other DVE
movement.
• Some WSEs have engaged in outreach and
networking opportunities abroad with
like-minded individuals to expand their
violent extremist networks. Such outreach
might lead to a greater risk of mobilization
to violence, including traveling to conflict
zones.
• Other racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremists could seek to exploit concerns
about social injustice issues to incite violence
and exploit otherwise peaceful protests
movements.
Another motivating force behind domestic
terrorism that also poses a threat to the
Homeland is anti-government/anti-authority
violent extremism.
• These violent extremists, sometimes
influenced by anarchist ideology, have
been associated with multiple plots and
attacks, which included a significant
uptick in violence against law enforcement
and government symbols in 2020. This
ideology is also exploited by hostile
nation-states, which seek to promote it
through disinformation campaigns and
sow additional chaos and discord across
American society.
• Anti-government and/or anti-authority
violent extremists are likely to be
emboldened by a perceived success
exploiting otherwise peaceful protest
movements and concealing violent tactics.
These violent extremists are increasingly
This chart depicts DVE and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) attacks in the US since 2018
that posed a threat to life, based on DHS data. 2019 was the most lethal year for domestic violent
extremism in the United States since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. We are still evaluating
data for incidents occurring in 2020. VEs perpetrated 16 attacks, killing 48, whereas HVEs conducted
5 attacks and killed 1 person. Among DVE actors, WSEs conducted half of all lethal attacks (8 of 16),
resulting in the majority of deaths (39 of 48). All the DVE attackers had a dominant violent extremist
ideology, with many motivated by multiple violent extremist ideologies or violent extremist
ideologies unconnected to global violent extremist groups.
Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity 19
taking advantage of large protest crowds to
conduct violence against government officials,
facilities, and counter-protestors.
• We also remain particularly concerned
about the impacts from COVID-19 where
anti-government and anti-authority violent
extremists could be motivated to conduct
attacks in response to perceived infringement
of liberties and government overreach as all
levels of government seek to limit the spread
of the coronavirus that has caused a worldwide
pandemic.
• Ideologies driven by such DVE’s often are
reinforced by a variety of online content,
including conspiracy theories and political
commentary they view as controversial.
Current events that DVEs perceive as infringing
on their worldviews often contribute to periods
of increased ideologically motivated violence,
including recently during the COVID-19
pandemic and nationwide lawful protests.
• The domestic threat environment is rapidly
evolving. Operational reporting shows that
DHS law enforcement officers suffered over
300 separate injuries while they were present
during months of nightly unrest in Portland,
Oregon. This is but one example among many
across the country, including in Brooklyn,
New York, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, where law
enforcement officers have been injured or
killed. These increasingly pervasive incidents
highlight the threat of anarchist violence that
has accelerated in our cities in recent months.
Foreign Terrorist Threats
Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), including
al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
(ISIS), will maintain interest in attacking the
Homeland but we expect the primary threat from
these groups to remain overseas in the coming year
due to sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure.
Nevertheless, these groups can adapt quickly
and resurge, and terrorists overseas will continue
to probe for vulnerabilities in U.S. immigration
and border security programs. Collectively,
vulnerabilities may create an illegal migration
environment that FTOs could exploit to facilitate
the movement of affiliated persons towards the
United States.
• The primary threat to the Homeland from
FTOs probably will manifest as “inspired”
attacks. FTOs seek to inspire violent extremism
in the United States and continue to use
social media and other online platforms to
call for attacks against the United States.
Despite territorial defeats in Iraq and Syria, ISIS
continues to draw support from HVEs in the
United States and the group’s global calls for
attacks have intensified since the death last
year of senior leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
• Transportation infrastructure—especially
the aviation sector—almost certainly will
remain a primary target for terrorists plotting
overseas. While terrorists continue to pursue
flight school training and the use of insiders,
plotting against domestic aviation targets
most likely will remain aspirational among
FTOs and their supporters over the next year.
• Terrorists and other criminal actors might
look to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to
threaten critical infrastructure. In 2019, there
were nearly 4,000 reports of unique incidents
of UAS activity near U.S. critical infrastructure
or public gatherings. Although we have no
indication that any of these events were
terrorism-related, it is possible that malicious
or criminal actors will turn to UAS tactics.
Iran and Lebanese Hizballah
Iran will continue to develop and maintain terrorist
capabilities as an option to deter the United
States from taking what Tehran considers regimethreatening actions or to retaliate for such activity,
real or perceived. The Government of Iran and its
proxy, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), have demonstrated
the intent to conduct an array of operations in the
Homeland. Iran or LH could advance an attack
plot—with little to no warning—in response
to heightened tensions. The U.S. Government
in recent years has arrested several individuals
acting on behalf of the Government of Iran or LH
who have conducted surveillance indicative of
contingency planning for lethal attacks in the U.S.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Threats
The overall global WMD threat will continue
8 In this instance, and for the purposes of this report, “violent actors” refers to groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence with the intent to cause
serious bodily harm and/or damage to critical infrastructure.
9
Homegrown White Supremist Extremist (WSE): A group or individual who facilitates or engages in acts of unlawful violence directed at the federal government, ethnic
minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and/or their perception that the government is
controlled by Jewish persons.
20 Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity
to rise in 2021. Spurred by continued capability
expansion, modernization, low yield weapons
development, eroding international norms,
information proliferation, emerging drone concerns
and increasing actor awareness; the risk of intentional
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents
in the homeland and abroad has likely increased.
• Biological threats (deliberate, accidental,
and naturally occurring) are more diverse
and continue to expand with increased
global interconnectivity and rapid advances
in biotechnology, genomics, and other
legitimate-use capabilities that could introduce
risks to global health and food security and
the potential for adversaries to develop novel
biological warfare agents. Notably, the biological
agent attribution shortfalls coupled with the
now known devastating impacts may lead to
a resurgence of state and non-state biological
weapon pursuits.
• Chemical threats are particularly notable as we
continue in the most significant and sustained
period of chemical weapons use in decades.
The publicity of emerging chemical weapons
compounds and increases in information
availability is evolving the chemical threat
landscape. This global trend could manifest as
an increased domestic threat.
• Radiological attacks are less likely, guidelines for
hazards and safe handling of radiation sources
reduce the likelihood of radiological attacks;
however, actors driven by extremist ideology
could pose a threat if they have knowledge
and access of locations to aid radioactive
materials acquisition. The major licensed users
of radioactive material in the United States are in
the energy, healthcare, and construction sectors
with larger activity sources protected by physical
security measures. The amount of radioactive
material in use is not expected to increase in the
short term.
• Nuclear threats remain enduring and will
remain largely unchanged. The number of
nuclear weapons states will probably remain
unchanged over the next year. Concerns remain
related to lower yield weapons development
and regional expansion of nuclear capabilities
by several nuclear weapons states and the
subsequent increasing risks of weapons loss
or nuclear conflict that could have global
impacts. Non-state actors continue to face
significant barriers to acquiring special
nuclear material for use in an improvised
nuclear device, but vulnerabilities remain.
Experts do, however, estimate the rate
of nuclear security improvement around
the globe has decreased since 2018. The
COVID-19 pandemic has drawn government
resources away from normal functions,
similar to resource shifts observed globally
in military and other defense sectors; nuclear
security may also be vulnerable to resource
shifts which could increase risks of theft or
sabotage of nuclear facilities. Domestic and
foreign-based non-state actors attempting
to steal special nuclear material for use in
a nuclear weapon will continue to pose a
threat to the Homeland.
Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity 21
TCO Threats to U.S. Security
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)—especially those based
in Mexico—will continue to undermine public health and safety in the
Homeland and threaten U.S. national security interests. They represent an
acute and devastating threat to public health and safety in the Homeland
and a significant threat to U.S. national security interests. Beyond their
complicity in the 71,000 drug overdose deaths in the U.S. last year,
TCOs destabilize partner nations, decrease citizen confidence in good
governance, foment corruption, and destroy confidence in the international
Department of Homeland Secruity
Page 17
• Anti-government and/or anti-authority
violent extremists are likely to be
emboldened by a perceived success
exploiting otherwise peaceful protest
movements and concealing violent tactics.
Violent Extremism in the United States.
The primary terrorist threat inside the United States
will stem from lone offenders and small cells of
individuals, including Domestic Violent Extremists6
(DVEs) and foreign terrorist-inspired Homegrown
Violent Extremists7
(HVEs). Some U.S.-based violent
extremists have capitalized on increased social
and political tensions in 2020, which will drive an
elevated threat environment at least through early
2021. Violent extremists will continue to target
individuals or institutions that represent symbols
of their grievances, as well as grievances based on
political affiliation or perceived policy positions.
The domestic situation surrounding the COVID-19
pandemic creates an environment that could
accelerate some individuals’ mobilization to
targeted violence or radicalization to terrorism.
Social distancing may lead to social isolation, which
is associated with depression, increased anxiety,
and social alienation. Similarly, work disruptions,
including unexpected unemployment and layoffs,
can also increase risk factors associated with
radicalization to violence and willingness to engage
in acts of targeted violence.
• Violent extremist media almost certainly will
spread violent extremist ideologies, especially
via social media, that encourage violence and
influence action within the United States.
• Violent extremists will continue their efforts to
exploit public fears associated with COVID-19
and social grievances driving lawful protests to
incite violence, intimidate targets, and promote
their violent extremist ideologies.
• Simple tactics—such as vehicle ramming, small
arms, edged weapons, arson, and rudimentary
improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—probably
will be most common. However, lone offenders
could employ more sophisticated means, to
include advanced and/or high-consequence
IEDs and using crude chemical, biological, and
radiological materials.
• While ISIS and other Foreign Terrorist
Organizations (FTOs) have called for attacks in
the West using “all available means,” biologicalfocused attempts would likely involve crudely
produced toxins and poisons. Similarly, during
the COVID-19 outbreak, domestic extremists
have called for the spread of the SARS-CoV-2
virus through unsophisticated means. While
significant expertise and infrastructure
limits the threat by low-level actors, even
rudimentary actions can result in economically
significant costs and incite fear without a
corresponding risk to health.
Some DVEs and other violent actors8
might
target events related to the 2020 Presidential
campaigns, the election itself, election results,
or the post-election period. Such actors could
mobilize quickly to threaten or engage in violence.
Violence related to government efforts to mitigate
the COVID-19 pandemic and amidst otherwise
ongoing lawful protests has exacerbated the typical
6 Domestic Violent Extremist (DVE): An individual based and operating primarily within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign
terrorist group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social goals wholly or in part through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of
political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be
constitutionally protected.
7
Homegrown Violent Extremist (HVE): A person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged
in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives
promoted by a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), but is acting independently of direction by an FTO. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage
in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.
18 Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity
election-season threat environment.
• Some DVEs have heightened their attention
to election- or campaign-related activities,
candidates’ public statements, and policy issues
connected to specific candidates, judging from
domestic terrorism plots since 2018 targeting
individuals based on their actual or perceived
political affiliations.
• Open-air, publicly accessible parts of physical
election infrastructure, such as campaignassociated mass gatherings, polling places, and
voter registration events, would be the most
likely flashpoints for potential violence.
Among DVEs, racially and ethnically motivated
violent extremists—specifically white supremacist
extremists9
(WSEs)—will remain the most persistent
and lethal threat in the Homeland. Spikes in
other DVE threats probably will depend on
political or social issues that often mobilize other
ideological actors to violence, such as immigration,
environmental, and police-related policy issues.
• WSEs have demonstrated longstanding intent to
target racial and religious minorities, members
of the LGBTQ+ community, politicians, and those
they believe promote multi-culturalism and
globalization at the expense of the WSE identity.
Since 2018, they have conducted more lethal
attacks in the United States than any other DVE
movement.
• Some WSEs have engaged in outreach and
networking opportunities abroad with
like-minded individuals to expand their
violent extremist networks. Such outreach
might lead to a greater risk of mobilization
to violence, including traveling to conflict
zones.
• Other racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremists could seek to exploit concerns
about social injustice issues to incite violence
and exploit otherwise peaceful protests
movements.
Another motivating force behind domestic
terrorism that also poses a threat to the
Homeland is anti-government/anti-authority
violent extremism.
• These violent extremists, sometimes
influenced by anarchist ideology, have
been associated with multiple plots and
attacks, which included a significant
uptick in violence against law enforcement
and government symbols in 2020. This
ideology is also exploited by hostile
nation-states, which seek to promote it
through disinformation campaigns and
sow additional chaos and discord across
American society.
• Anti-government and/or anti-authority
violent extremists are likely to be
emboldened by a perceived success
exploiting otherwise peaceful protest
movements and concealing violent tactics.
These violent extremists are increasingly
This chart depicts DVE and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) attacks in the US since 2018
that posed a threat to life, based on DHS data. 2019 was the most lethal year for domestic violent
extremism in the United States since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. We are still evaluating
data for incidents occurring in 2020. VEs perpetrated 16 attacks, killing 48, whereas HVEs conducted
5 attacks and killed 1 person. Among DVE actors, WSEs conducted half of all lethal attacks (8 of 16),
resulting in the majority of deaths (39 of 48). All the DVE attackers had a dominant violent extremist
ideology, with many motivated by multiple violent extremist ideologies or violent extremist
ideologies unconnected to global violent extremist groups.
Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity 19
taking advantage of large protest crowds to
conduct violence against government officials,
facilities, and counter-protestors.
• We also remain particularly concerned
about the impacts from COVID-19 where
anti-government and anti-authority violent
extremists could be motivated to conduct
attacks in response to perceived infringement
of liberties and government overreach as all
levels of government seek to limit the spread
of the coronavirus that has caused a worldwide
pandemic.
• Ideologies driven by such DVE’s often are
reinforced by a variety of online content,
including conspiracy theories and political
commentary they view as controversial.
Current events that DVEs perceive as infringing
on their worldviews often contribute to periods
of increased ideologically motivated violence,
including recently during the COVID-19
pandemic and nationwide lawful protests.
• The domestic threat environment is rapidly
evolving. Operational reporting shows that
DHS law enforcement officers suffered over
300 separate injuries while they were present
during months of nightly unrest in Portland,
Oregon. This is but one example among many
across the country, including in Brooklyn,
New York, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, where law
enforcement officers have been injured or
killed. These increasingly pervasive incidents
highlight the threat of anarchist violence that
has accelerated in our cities in recent months.
Foreign Terrorist Threats
Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), including
al-Qa‘ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
(ISIS), will maintain interest in attacking the
Homeland but we expect the primary threat from
these groups to remain overseas in the coming year
due to sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure.
Nevertheless, these groups can adapt quickly
and resurge, and terrorists overseas will continue
to probe for vulnerabilities in U.S. immigration
and border security programs. Collectively,
vulnerabilities may create an illegal migration
environment that FTOs could exploit to facilitate
the movement of affiliated persons towards the
United States.
• The primary threat to the Homeland from
FTOs probably will manifest as “inspired”
attacks. FTOs seek to inspire violent extremism
in the United States and continue to use
social media and other online platforms to
call for attacks against the United States.
Despite territorial defeats in Iraq and Syria, ISIS
continues to draw support from HVEs in the
United States and the group’s global calls for
attacks have intensified since the death last
year of senior leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
• Transportation infrastructure—especially
the aviation sector—almost certainly will
remain a primary target for terrorists plotting
overseas. While terrorists continue to pursue
flight school training and the use of insiders,
plotting against domestic aviation targets
most likely will remain aspirational among
FTOs and their supporters over the next year.
• Terrorists and other criminal actors might
look to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to
threaten critical infrastructure. In 2019, there
were nearly 4,000 reports of unique incidents
of UAS activity near U.S. critical infrastructure
or public gatherings. Although we have no
indication that any of these events were
terrorism-related, it is possible that malicious
or criminal actors will turn to UAS tactics.
Iran and Lebanese Hizballah
Iran will continue to develop and maintain terrorist
capabilities as an option to deter the United
States from taking what Tehran considers regimethreatening actions or to retaliate for such activity,
real or perceived. The Government of Iran and its
proxy, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), have demonstrated
the intent to conduct an array of operations in the
Homeland. Iran or LH could advance an attack
plot—with little to no warning—in response
to heightened tensions. The U.S. Government
in recent years has arrested several individuals
acting on behalf of the Government of Iran or LH
who have conducted surveillance indicative of
contingency planning for lethal attacks in the U.S.
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Other
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Threats
The overall global WMD threat will continue
8 In this instance, and for the purposes of this report, “violent actors” refers to groups or individuals who facilitate or engage in unlawful acts of violence with the intent to cause
serious bodily harm and/or damage to critical infrastructure.
9
Homegrown White Supremist Extremist (WSE): A group or individual who facilitates or engages in acts of unlawful violence directed at the federal government, ethnic
minorities, or Jewish persons in support of their belief that Caucasians are intellectually and morally superior to other races and/or their perception that the government is
controlled by Jewish persons.
20 Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity
to rise in 2021. Spurred by continued capability
expansion, modernization, low yield weapons
development, eroding international norms,
information proliferation, emerging drone concerns
and increasing actor awareness; the risk of intentional
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents
in the homeland and abroad has likely increased.
• Biological threats (deliberate, accidental,
and naturally occurring) are more diverse
and continue to expand with increased
global interconnectivity and rapid advances
in biotechnology, genomics, and other
legitimate-use capabilities that could introduce
risks to global health and food security and
the potential for adversaries to develop novel
biological warfare agents. Notably, the biological
agent attribution shortfalls coupled with the
now known devastating impacts may lead to
a resurgence of state and non-state biological
weapon pursuits.
• Chemical threats are particularly notable as we
continue in the most significant and sustained
period of chemical weapons use in decades.
The publicity of emerging chemical weapons
compounds and increases in information
availability is evolving the chemical threat
landscape. This global trend could manifest as
an increased domestic threat.
• Radiological attacks are less likely, guidelines for
hazards and safe handling of radiation sources
reduce the likelihood of radiological attacks;
however, actors driven by extremist ideology
could pose a threat if they have knowledge
and access of locations to aid radioactive
materials acquisition. The major licensed users
of radioactive material in the United States are in
the energy, healthcare, and construction sectors
with larger activity sources protected by physical
security measures. The amount of radioactive
material in use is not expected to increase in the
short term.
• Nuclear threats remain enduring and will
remain largely unchanged. The number of
nuclear weapons states will probably remain
unchanged over the next year. Concerns remain
related to lower yield weapons development
and regional expansion of nuclear capabilities
by several nuclear weapons states and the
subsequent increasing risks of weapons loss
or nuclear conflict that could have global
impacts. Non-state actors continue to face
significant barriers to acquiring special
nuclear material for use in an improvised
nuclear device, but vulnerabilities remain.
Experts do, however, estimate the rate
of nuclear security improvement around
the globe has decreased since 2018. The
COVID-19 pandemic has drawn government
resources away from normal functions,
similar to resource shifts observed globally
in military and other defense sectors; nuclear
security may also be vulnerable to resource
shifts which could increase risks of theft or
sabotage of nuclear facilities. Domestic and
foreign-based non-state actors attempting
to steal special nuclear material for use in
a nuclear weapon will continue to pose a
threat to the Homeland.
Homeland Threat Assessment U.S. Department of Homeland Secruity 21
TCO Threats to U.S. Security
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)—especially those based
in Mexico—will continue to undermine public health and safety in the
Homeland and threaten U.S. national security interests. They represent an
acute and devastating threat to public health and safety in the Homeland
and a significant threat to U.S. national security interests. Beyond their
complicity in the 71,000 drug overdose deaths in the U.S. last year,
TCOs destabilize partner nations, decrease citizen confidence in good
governance, foment corruption, and destroy confidence in the international
