I am glad for two reasons that weaver found this h

I am glad for two reasons that weaver found this hidden jewel. The first reason is a marketplace reason. Wavesense was a failed product, at least for the last 9 years, and was previously manufactured in Korea for a company called Agamatrix from New Hampshire. Agamatrix had two product lines, the Jazz (and variants) for retail sales and its original product Wavesense which unfortunately went nowhere. The Jazz was marginally successful and today the major, if not only customer, is CVS who uses Jazz as a house brand product.

KB knows a lot about the Wavesense because in late 2010 Agamatrix attempted to hire KB away from DECN to manage that product for them. At the time of Agamatrix sales pitch to KB, he was in the hospital being treated for a moderate health problem caused by an earlier hockey playing career -- a smaller guy with a heart too big.

In any event, KB decided that Jazz, as a universal house brand product, would not make it big, because it faced competition in the private label sphere from HDI (which became Nipro, and now Sinocare) and that Wavesense would not make it, no matter what he thought of that product, because the meter was typical of the Korean made products at that time -- uninspiring and not the type of meter from a human engineering standpoint that could grow into a personal appliance like the Lifescan Ultra Mini, the Roche Aviva, or the Abbott Freestyle Lite.

Now a little about Wavesense. The original Wavesense was/is a me-too product. It's sole appeal was its marketplace price. Adding the "Abbott" HCT correction algorithm (all of the Abbott Freestyle Lite products have had this algorithm since 2008), to the Wavesense product was/is a worthwhile endeavor because Abbott has two second line products that are a lot long of tooth -- their Precision/Optium line. And repeated name and branding changes have not helped Abbott much since Medicare killed the mail order strip market in 2013.

But the HCT correction used by Abbott is first generation. In the industry we call it flow stream time measurement, where when the blood enters the test strip flow stream where reagent is them added and a glucose measurement is taken, just prior to that the speed of the blood plasma is taken by a sensor in the meter and a regression algorithm applied. A slower flow of the plasma means more red cells slipped through along with the plasma, a faster flow means fewer cells slipped through. More cells slipping through means the glucose measurement, without correction the glucose result would be artificially low and you get the point. Add a mathematical correction and the effect of the red blood cells is minimized. It is cut in half and using this type of methodology allows some 2010-2019 Big 4 meters to meet ISO 15197:2015 guidelines. The FDA adopted even more stringent guidelines in its 2016 Guidance for glucometers and glucometer systems, but during the government shutdown the FDA quietly abandoned their guidelines because with the exception of the Lifescan Verio and Roche Aviva Plus, no new glucometer system or technology could get through the review process without a waiver. Now that policy suited middle level Obama holdovers at the FDA who hate small business, just like their messiah, but Commissioner Scott Gottleib wanted no part of this FDA partisan bias. He fixed the problem but found he could never earn the trust again of people he would have to work with, so now he is leaving. Well too much about clinical chemistry and glucometers and FDA politics but before I move on, KB likes to say that he is responsible for Scott Gottleib getting his job in the first place because KB nearly hired him for his 2014-2016 battle with the FDA higher-ups. He and Scott decided it would be best to hire the other guy, and the rest is history.

Abbott Freestyle Lite, Roche Aviva Plus and Lifescan Verio use the 50 percent solution. Lifescan in 2011 and 2012 adopted another solution, sort of the dECN solution, and the FDA killed it. Had the Lifescan solution seen the light of day, they would today own the market, not just the 41% they controlled in 2011, but in the high 50s today. But alas the FDA dragon lady killed them.

GenUltimate TBG employs a different methodology, actually two methodologies to correct for HCT, and while the newer generation Abbott, Roche and Lifescan leave 4% - 8% of the HCT to chance, DECN's new product doesn't, It corrects for all but <1%. And that is truly remarkable. And while Lifescan, even under Platinum, has found that a slide to "me too" is not fun, GenUltimate TBG can/will fix that for them. And I know that stock traders don't really care about much more than stock price, Platinum will/should be left with a choice of expensive decisions. Either acquire/license GenUltimate TBG or allow someone else who is big and bad to acquire GenUltimate TBG and risk losing the remainder of their OneTouch Ultra base. The decision is that simple, and like in many products today, its all in the software.

Look for DECN to file patents on its truly remarkable solution, and as soon as they raise some capital, bring back GenPrecis, the original product idea. GenUltimate TBG is wonderful because it solves a 15 year old problem for the largest single base of diabetic users, but GenPrecis brings the same solution, perhaps a little better because the overall glucose chemistry is better, to the private label and house brand marketplace.

In the end, like in all American business, it is about innovation and ideas, not stock price, typos and bold faced lies about management. In my opinion way too few DECN shareholders understand this and many never will or want to.