Introduction to: ACS Keystroke Transport Layer
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Posted On: 01/20/2019 9:54:16 PM
Introduction to:
ACS Keystroke Transport Layer Security™ (KTLS™)
Up until now, enterprises and government agencies
have lacked the ability to fully protect their endpoints
from a zero day keylogger, the single biggest threat that is
leveraged in the first stages of almost all advanced
threats. A keylogger, a primary component of all malware
and advanced persistent threats, is a type of surveillance
software that has the capability to record every keystroke
an employee makes on their keyboard. In addition, most
keyloggers come with the ability to change their form
(polymorphic) and go on undetected as they quickly
spread between the endpoints within the Enterprise.
KTLS ™ Protocol’s basic premise is that strong
cryptography should always begin at Ring 0 and not only
at Layer 4, Transport Layer, of the OSI.
KTLS™ Overview:
Keystroke Transport Layer Security™ (KTLS™) is an ACS
patented cryptographic protocol that provides for the
encryption and transport of keystrokes originating from the
kernel at the time of secure boot, entry in to any
application, web application or web browser. While SSL
and TLS begin strong cryptography at Layer 4 or, the
Transport Layer within OSI, KTLS™ begins strong
cryptography from the kernel level at ring 0 and encrypts
all keystrokes
KTLS™ protocol can be utilized in both endpoint desktop
(PC and MAC) and endpoint mobile (IOS and Android)
environments as a primary component of endpoint
security. Endpointlock™ is the commercial product name
by which KTLS™ protocol is implemented within an
enterprise.
The primary goal of the patented KTLS™ protocol is to
provide strong cryptography at the time of keystroke entry
to protect the initial transmission of usernames and
passwords (as required by HIPPA, PCI 8.2.1 and 8.2.1a
and Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Guidelines (“CIP”) and subsequent keystrokes entered in
to any program or application.
When secured by KTLS™ protocol, connections between the keystroke and
applications have the following properties:
• Keystroke Cryptography begins within the kernel at Ring 0.
• Both encryption and decryption occur directly within the application without any
modification to the application required.
• The keys for this symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each
connection and are based on a shared secret that is generated directly from the
Trusted Platform Module (“TPM”).
• The negotiation of a shared secret is both secure (the negotiated secret is
unavailable to Keyloggers and cannot be obtained, even by an attacker who
places himself in the middle of the connection) and reliable (no attacker can
modify the keystroke transmission during the negotiation without being detected
and kernel layer alerts being generated).
• The Key management is the management of cryptographic keys. KTLS™ uses
the AES algorithm with a key size of 256 bits to encrypt keystrokes. AES is a
symmetric encryption scheme. The same key is used to encrypt and decrypt.
• The Session key is generated once per session (KTLS™ loaded/unloaded). It
can be generated either by a TPM chip (if it is there), or else by a built-in Random
Number Generator.
• If a TPM chip is available for access to the KTLS™ system components, the
Session Key is encrypted/decrypted by a TPM Master Key Pair (RSA 2048 public
key cryptosystem), which resides on the TPM chip (and never leaves it).
• The encrypted Session Key is stored in secure memory shared by all KTLS™
system components. The TPM Master Key Pair is generated by the TPM chip
every time the computer is powered up. This can be accessed via the NULL
hierarchy.
• If a TPM chip is not available for access to the KTLS™ system components, the
Session Key is encrypted/decrypted by a Storage Master Key (AES 256 Key)
comprised of a combination of a hard coded part and a randomly generated part.
U.S. Department of Defense
TPM Requirements
The United States Department of
Defense (DoD) specifies that
"new computer assets (e.g.,
server, desktop, laptop, thin
client, tablet, smartphone,
personal digital assistant,
mobile phone) procured to
support DoD will include a TPM
version 1.2 or higher where
required by DISA STIGs and
where such technology is
available." The TPM is
anticipated to be used for device
identification, authentication,
encryption, measurement, and
device integrity.
KTLS™ protocol is currently
integrated in to Intel’s TPM for
enterprise endpoint desktop
deployments. If Intel (or other)
TPM is available for mobile
devices KTLS™ protocol can be
deployed.
ACS Keystroke Transport Layer Security™ (KTLS™)
Up until now, enterprises and government agencies
have lacked the ability to fully protect their endpoints
from a zero day keylogger, the single biggest threat that is
leveraged in the first stages of almost all advanced
threats. A keylogger, a primary component of all malware
and advanced persistent threats, is a type of surveillance
software that has the capability to record every keystroke
an employee makes on their keyboard. In addition, most
keyloggers come with the ability to change their form
(polymorphic) and go on undetected as they quickly
spread between the endpoints within the Enterprise.
KTLS ™ Protocol’s basic premise is that strong
cryptography should always begin at Ring 0 and not only
at Layer 4, Transport Layer, of the OSI.
KTLS™ Overview:
Keystroke Transport Layer Security™ (KTLS™) is an ACS
patented cryptographic protocol that provides for the
encryption and transport of keystrokes originating from the
kernel at the time of secure boot, entry in to any
application, web application or web browser. While SSL
and TLS begin strong cryptography at Layer 4 or, the
Transport Layer within OSI, KTLS™ begins strong
cryptography from the kernel level at ring 0 and encrypts
all keystrokes
KTLS™ protocol can be utilized in both endpoint desktop
(PC and MAC) and endpoint mobile (IOS and Android)
environments as a primary component of endpoint
security. Endpointlock™ is the commercial product name
by which KTLS™ protocol is implemented within an
enterprise.
The primary goal of the patented KTLS™ protocol is to
provide strong cryptography at the time of keystroke entry
to protect the initial transmission of usernames and
passwords (as required by HIPPA, PCI 8.2.1 and 8.2.1a
and Homeland Security’s Critical Infrastructure Protection
Guidelines (“CIP”) and subsequent keystrokes entered in
to any program or application.
When secured by KTLS™ protocol, connections between the keystroke and
applications have the following properties:
• Keystroke Cryptography begins within the kernel at Ring 0.
• Both encryption and decryption occur directly within the application without any
modification to the application required.
• The keys for this symmetric encryption are generated uniquely for each
connection and are based on a shared secret that is generated directly from the
Trusted Platform Module (“TPM”).
• The negotiation of a shared secret is both secure (the negotiated secret is
unavailable to Keyloggers and cannot be obtained, even by an attacker who
places himself in the middle of the connection) and reliable (no attacker can
modify the keystroke transmission during the negotiation without being detected
and kernel layer alerts being generated).
• The Key management is the management of cryptographic keys. KTLS™ uses
the AES algorithm with a key size of 256 bits to encrypt keystrokes. AES is a
symmetric encryption scheme. The same key is used to encrypt and decrypt.
• The Session key is generated once per session (KTLS™ loaded/unloaded). It
can be generated either by a TPM chip (if it is there), or else by a built-in Random
Number Generator.
• If a TPM chip is available for access to the KTLS™ system components, the
Session Key is encrypted/decrypted by a TPM Master Key Pair (RSA 2048 public
key cryptosystem), which resides on the TPM chip (and never leaves it).
• The encrypted Session Key is stored in secure memory shared by all KTLS™
system components. The TPM Master Key Pair is generated by the TPM chip
every time the computer is powered up. This can be accessed via the NULL
hierarchy.
• If a TPM chip is not available for access to the KTLS™ system components, the
Session Key is encrypted/decrypted by a Storage Master Key (AES 256 Key)
comprised of a combination of a hard coded part and a randomly generated part.
U.S. Department of Defense
TPM Requirements
The United States Department of
Defense (DoD) specifies that
"new computer assets (e.g.,
server, desktop, laptop, thin
client, tablet, smartphone,
personal digital assistant,
mobile phone) procured to
support DoD will include a TPM
version 1.2 or higher where
required by DISA STIGs and
where such technology is
available." The TPM is
anticipated to be used for device
identification, authentication,
encryption, measurement, and
device integrity.
KTLS™ protocol is currently
integrated in to Intel’s TPM for
enterprise endpoint desktop
deployments. If Intel (or other)
TPM is available for mobile
devices KTLS™ protocol can be
deployed.
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Never argue with stupid people, they will drag you down to their level and then beat you with experience.
Get .... PrivacyLok https://cyberidguard.com/
Try SafeVchat: https://cyberidguard.com/
My comments are only my opinion and are not to be used for investment advice.
Please conduct your own due diligence before choosing to buy or sell any stock.
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