$PSGR Prison for Pershing Personnel for Reg.F.D. V

$PSGR Prison for Pershing Personnel for Reg.F.D. Violations ?


https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-regfdhtm.html

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Fair Disclosure, Regulation FD
Regulation FD addresses the selective disclosure of information by publicly traded companies and other issuers. Regulation FD provides that when an issuer discloses material nonpublic information to certain individuals or entities—generally, securities market professionals, such as stock analysts, or holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information—the issuer must make public disclosure of that information. In this way, Regulation FD aims to promote the full and fair disclosure.

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https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm

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Final Rule:
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 240, 243, and 249
Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99
RIN 3235-AH82
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission is adopting new rules to address three issues: the selective disclosure by issuers of material nonpublic information; when insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader's "use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information; and when the breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. The rules are designed to promote the full and fair disclosure of information by issuers, and to clarify and enhance existing prohibitions against insider trading.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The new rules and amendments will take effect October 23, 2000.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Richard A. Levine, Sharon Zamore, or Jacob Lesser, Office of the General Counsel at (202) 942-0890; Amy Starr, Office of Chief Counsel, Division of Corporation Finance at (202) 942-2900.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Securities and Exchange Commission today is adopting new rules: Regulation FD,1 Rule 10b5-1,2 and Rule 10b5-2.3 Additionally, the Commission is adopting amendments to Form 8-K.4

I. Executive Summary

We are adopting new rules and amendments to address the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information by issuers and to clarify two issues under the law of insider trading. In response to the comments we received on the proposal, we have made several modifications, as discussed below, in the final rules.

Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses selective disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it must make public disclosure of that information. The timing of the required public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was intentional or non-intentional; for an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, the issuer must make public disclosure promptly. Under the regulation, the required public disclosure may be made by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by another method or combination of methods that is reasonably designed to effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.

Rule 10b5-1 addresses the issue of when insider trading liability arises in connection with a trader's "use" or "knowing possession" of material nonpublic information. This rule provides that a person trades "on the basis of" material nonpublic information when the person purchases or sells securities while aware of the information. However, the rule also sets forth several affirmative defenses, which we have modified in response to comments, to permit persons to trade in certain circumstances where it is clear that the information was not a factor in the decision to trade.

Rule 10b5-2 addresses the issue of when a breach of a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under the misappropriation theory of insider trading. The rule sets forth three non-exclusive bases for determining that a duty of trust or confidence was owed by a person receiving information, and will provide greater certainty and clarity on this unsettled issue.

II. Selective Disclosure: Regulation FD

A. Background

As discussed in the Proposing Release,5 we have become increasingly concerned about the selective disclosure of material information by issuers. As reflected in recent publicized reports, many issuers are disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.

We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security's price change dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.

Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to ordinary "tipping" and insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge -- and the ability to use that edge to profit -- from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence. Likewise, selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market integrity that is similar to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading: investors lose confidence in the fairness of the markets when they know that other participants may exploit "unerodable informational advantages" derived not from hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate insiders.6 The economic effects of the two practices are essentially the same. Yet, as a result of judicial interpretations, tipping and insider trading can be severely punished under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whereas the status of issuer selective disclosure has been considerably less clear.7

Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our markets: the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors . As noted in the Proposing Release, in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to selectively disclosed information. We are concerned, in this regard, with reports that analysts who publish negative views of an issuer are sometimes excluded by that issuer from calls and meetings to which other analysts are invited.8

Finally, as we also observed in the Proposing Release, technological developments have made it much easier for issuers to disseminate information broadly. Whereas issuers once may have had to rely on analysts to serve as information intermediaries, issuers now can use a variety of methods to communicate directly with the market. In addition to press releases, these methods include, among others, Internet webcasting and teleconferencing. Accordingly, technological limitations no longer provide an excuse for abiding the threats to market integrity that selective disclosure represents.

To address the problem of selective disclosure, we proposed Regulation FD. It targets the practice by establishing new requirements for full and fair disclosure by public companies.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_Fair_Disclosure

Regulation Fair Disclosure

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Regulation Fair Disclosure,[1] also commonly referred to as Regulation FD or Reg FD, is a regulation that was promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in August 2000.[2] The rule mandates that all publicly traded companies must disclose material information to all investors at the same time .

The regulation sought to stamp out selective disclosure, in which some investors (often large institutional investors) received market moving information before others (often smaller, individual investors).

Regulation FD fundamentally changed how companies communicate with investors by bringing more transparency and more frequent and timely communications, perhaps more than any other regulation in the history of the SEC.

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S.E.C. Action is necessary , and NOW ! ! !


Pershing holds ALL SMALL INVESTORS IN CONTEMPT !

If they are as egregiously violating Reg. F.D. as I believe,
then a prison sentence might be appropriate . .. Maybe .

Prison for Stephen D. Plumb ?
Prison for Joel Adams III ?
Prison for William B. Earnshaw ?

( Of course it will be up to the Judge . .. Violators are more
often given large fines and proscribed from certain beha-
viors in the future. .. But as a long-suffering investor, put-
ting these directors behind base-metal bars strikes a res-
onant chord with me. .. No golden chains or hand-cuffs for
these malingering laggards. )



Until2017