University of Chicago Law School Professor Laura W
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Weinrib took to the pages of the Los Angeles Times to condemn the ACLU’s recent decisions to defend speech rights of white supremacists who rallied in Charlottesville on August 11 and 12. In the aftermath of the rally, the ACLU released a statement defending the rights of the marchers, clarifying only that the First Amendment “does not protect people who incite or engage in violence.”
Writing in her op-ed, Weinrib questions the assumptions commonly made about the ACLU’s history of defending the speech rights of extremists. She reminds readers that the ACLU primarily views free speech as a tool of social justice. That is, the First Amendment provides a means of expression for marginalized persons to liberate themselves through expression.
Commentators have rightly observed that the ACLU has defended far-right speech since its founding, despite fierce criticism. But there is a common and mistaken premise in this analysis. It assumes that the organization has always believed, as it does today, that “freedom of expression is an end in itself.” In reality, the early ACLU viewed free speech as a tool of social justice, suited to particular purposes under particular conditions.
Professor Weinrib argues that the ACLU’s defense of Nazi speech in the 1930s was a product of the historical moment.