One of those links: Revising U.S. Grand Strateg
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Posted On: 07/07/2016 8:02:21 AM
One of those links:
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China
One comment: China as it is now
cannot become a part of a world liberalism.
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
system should be resisted and met with a unified response by the
industrial democracies, led by the United States. Washington should
continue to press Beijing to bring China’s currency in line with its
actual market value.
■
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Fashion effective policies to deal with China’s pervasive use of geoeco
-
nomic tools in Asia and beyond.
Never in history has one government
so directly controlled so much wealth as does the leadership of China.
It is not surprising, then, that as China’s economic might has grown,
so has its ability and inclination to use this power to advance geopo
-
litical ends. China is often correctly described as the world’s leading
practitioner of geoeconomics. For the purposes of this report, geo
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economics is defined as “the use of economic instruments for geopo
-
litical objectives.”
43
This has been reflected in coercive geoeconomic
Chinese policies toward Japan, ASEAN nations, and Australia,
among others, with no serious U.S. policy response. A geoeconomic
foreign policy approach would entail these initiatives:
■
■
U.S.-Asian alliances should be rebooted for offensive and defen
-
sive geoeconomic action. This intensified alliance focus should
be as concentrated on geoeconomics as on political-military
instruments.
■
■
The administration should construct a geoeconomic policy to deal
with China over the long term, using the strength and positive
power of the U.S. economy, innovation, and networks to attract
Asian nations; and deal with the PRC’s coercive pressure on its
neighbors, in ways that are always consistent with an international
rules-based system that is so obviously in the national interest of
the United States and its friends and allies.
■
■
The U.S. energy revolution should be converted into lasting geo
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political gains in Asia by eliminating constraints on supplying U.S.
allies and friends with gas and oil.
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■
Create, in partnership with U.S. allies and like-minded partners, a new
technology-control regime vis-à-vis beijing.
Washington should pay
increased attention to limiting China’s access to advanced weap
-
onry and militarily critical technologies. Although the United States
certainly should lead the West in expanding international trade,
this policy ought not to be extended to the point where it actually
undermines American power and erodes Washington’s ability to
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Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
discharge its fundamental obligation to guarantee Asian and global
security and meet the Chinese challenge. The virtues of enhanced
trade with China “must not obscure the reality that deepening glo
-
balization increases Beijing’s access to sophisticated weaponry and
its associated elements,” including through dual-use technologies.
44
Such acquisitions can undermine any American success in balancing
China’s rise with decisive and dangerous consequences.
Today, such capabilities obviously do not reside solely in the United
States—they can be found in many nations, especially Washington’s
European and Asian allies. The United States should encourage these
countries to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s
access to all technologies, including dual use, that can inflict “high-
leverage strategic harm.”
45
To establish a new technology regime
toward China, Washington should enter into an immediate discus
-
sion with allies and friends with the aim of tightening restrictions on
the sales of militarily critical technologies to China, including dual-
use technologies. This will obviously not be easy to accomplish, but
the effort should get under way immediately.
Strengt
Hen t
He u.S. Military
The United States should invest in defense capabilities and capacity
specifically to defeat China’s emerging anti-access capabilities and
permit successful U.S. power projection even against concerted oppo
-
sition from Beijing.
At present, the Obama administration’s military component to
strengthen U.S. power projection in Asia is small: adding a fourth attack
submarine to Guam; rotating 2,500 marines to Darwin, Australia;
putting a small number of littoral combat ships in Singapore; making
minor improvements in technology, intelligence, and missile defense;
and increasing U.S. naval forces in Asia from 50 percent to 60 percent
over the long term.
46
No nation in Asia, least of all China, will take seriously U.S. mili
-
tary enhancement in Asia unless the United States takes the following
vigorous and comprehensive steps:
■
■
Congress should remove sequestration caps and substantially
increase the U.S. defense budget.
47
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Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■
■
The White House should work with Congress on thoughtful, mean
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ingful reform of the defense budget and force design. Absent that,
the internal cost drivers (compensation and entitlements) within the
budget will outpace any reasonable increase to the budget.
■
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The existing nuclear balance between the United States and China
should be maintained, as it is crucial to the U.S. posture in Asia.
■
■
Washington should accelerate U.S. military capabilities to coun
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ter China’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) programs, especially
in those areas where the United States retains advantage, such as
stealthy long-range unmanned vehicles and undersea warfare.
■
■
Washington should reiterate its insistence on freedom of navigation
and overflight, including in exclusive economic zones, for military as
well as civilian ships and planes, and challenge Beijing appropriately
if those norms are violated.
■
■
Washington should build military capability and capacity to increase
interoperability with allies and partners in Asia to include aiding the
regional states to develop their own A2/AD capabilities against China.
■
■
Washington should accelerate the U.S. ballistic missile defense
posture and network in the Pacific to support allies, among other
objectives.
■
■
Washington should enhance efforts to protect its space domain
while developing an aerial alternative to space for high-volume
communications.
■
■
Washington should intensify a consistent U.S. naval and air presence
in the South and East China Seas.
■
■
Washington should increase the frequency and duration of naval
exercises with South China Sea littoral states.
iMP
leMent effecti
Ve cyber P
Olicie
S
For the past decade, the United States has tolerated incessant cyber
-
attacks by China on the U.S. government, critical infrastructure, and
businesses. Virtually nothing has been done to stop this cyber assault,
and the “name and shame” approach toward China has clearly failed.
(The U.S. indictment of five PLA officers, of course, had no impact on
China’s cyber espionage.) The Department of Defense cyber strategy
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Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
published in 2011 announced a new doctrine, arguing that harmful
action within the cyber domain can be met with a parallel response
in another domain, known as equivalence.
48
No such equivalence has
been exacted on China. Such passivity on the part of the United States
should end, especially since there is no way to reach a verifiable cyberse-
curity agreement with China. The United States should implement the
following cyber policies:
■
■
Impose costs on China that are in excess of the benefits it receives
from its violations in cyberspace. A good starting point is the recom
-
mendation of the Blair-Huntsman Commission of an across-the-
board tariff on Chinese goods.
49
■
■
Increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities to dissuade China’s leaders
from using cyberattacks against the United States and its partners in
the region.
■
■
Continue to improve U.S. cyber defenses. Securing cyberspace will
require congressional action, including a law regulating information
sharing between intelligence agencies and the corporate world.
■
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Pass relevant legislation in Congress, such as the Cyber Information
Security Protection Act, allowing businesses to rapidly share intel
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ligence on cyber threats with each other and the government without
fear of lawsuits.
reinfOrce i
ndO
-Pacific Partner
SH
iPS
The United States should reinforce a new web of partnerships through
-
out Asia that includes traditional U.S. alliances but goes beyond them,
pursuing as an explicit policy the objectives of both strengthening
Asian states to cope with China independently and building new forms
of intra-Asian strategic cooperation that do not always involve, but will
be systematically supported by, the United States.
The United States cannot defend its national interests in Asia with
-
out sustained support from its allies and friends. In one way or another,
the PRC seeks to undermine each of these crucial bilateral relationships
to test American strength and resilience in defending and promot
-
ing these ties in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. The first step
in combating these corrosive Chinese efforts is to recognize that they
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Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
are occurring; the second is to develop strategies to defeat them. At the
same time, it is essential that Washington constantly reassure its demo
-
cratic partners in Asia that it seeks to avoid a confrontation with China
and that the steps delineated below are prudent in order to maintain the
existing balance of power and to protect Western national interests in
the Indo-Pacific.
■
■
japan:
No other U.S. relationship approaches that with Japan in
maintaining the current balance in Asia and dealing with the rise
of Chinese power. Indeed, without close and enduring U.S.-Japan
security cooperation, it is difficult to see how the United States could
maintain its present power and influence in Asia. Thus, as Japan con
-
tinues to emerge from its post–World War II self-imposed security
constraints, the United States should continually support this crucial
alliance partner by
■
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substantially expanding its security relationship with Japan, encom
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passing all of Asia;
■
■
helping upgrade the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), includ
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ing Japan’s capabilities for joint/combined-arms/amphibious
operations;
■
■
aligning concepts such as air-sea battle and dynamic defense
through a dialogue with Japan on roles, missions, and capabilities;
50
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reinvigorating an extended deterrence dialogue with Japan;
■
■
intensifying ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with
Japan;
■
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signaling more often that Japan remains fully and reliably under a
U.S. security umbrella;
■
■
supporting Japan’s cooperation with Vietnam, Australia, India, and
other nations concerned with the rise of Chinese power; and
■
■
allowing liquefied natural gas exports to Japan.
■
■
South korea
:
The U.S. strategic relationship with the Republic of
Korea (ROK) is essential to maintaining the balance of power in Asia.
In that context, these bilateral ties should be reinforced by
■
■
ensuring adequate military capabilities are present on the Korean
peninsula in the context of provocations from North Korea;
■
■
working with the ROK (and Japan) to develop a comprehensive
strategy for regime change in North Korea;
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Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■
■
formulating with Seoul a shared vision for dealing with Korean
unification;
■
■
boosting the credibility of U.S.-extended nuclear guarantees to
South Korea;
■
■
increasing support for the ROK’s BMD capabilities; and
■
■
encouraging the ROK to eventually join the TPP.
■
■
Australia:
Australia is the southern anchor of U.S. relationships in
the Pacific and, as a nation facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans, an
essential link in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States and
Australia should cooperate to achieve the following goals:
■
■
The United States should use the Stirling naval base near Perth to
support increased U.S. naval force structure in the region.
■
■
The United States should immediately accelerate cyber, space, and
undersea cooperation with Australia.
■
■
The United States and Australia should jointly deploy surveillance
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles on the Cocos Islands (Aus
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tralian territory) in the Indian Ocean.
■
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The two countries should work together to more rapidly identify
potential Australian contributions to ballistic missile defense.
■
■
The scope and frequency of Australia’s hosting of rotational
deployments of U.S. military personnel should be increased.
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■
■
The U.S.-Australia free trade agreement should be upgraded, par
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ticularly as Australia progresses toward FTAs with Japan, Korea,
and China.
52
Similarly, Australia should be included in the TPP.
■
■
Washington should support Australia’s efforts to expand its strate-
gic interaction with like-minded Asian nations.
■
■
india:
Especially in the face of an increasingly assertive China, the
United States benefits from the presence of a robust democratic
power that is willing to and capable of independently balancing Bei
-
jing’s rising influence in Asia.
53
The United States should
■
■
substantially loosen its restraints on military technology transfer
to India;
■
■
regard Indian nuclear weapons as an asset in maintaining the cur
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rent balance of power in Asia;
■
■
markedly increase U.S.-India military-to-military cooperation,
especially between the two navies;
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Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■
■
systemically assist India in building maritime capabilities in the
Indian Ocean and beyond, including through substantial technol
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ogy transfer;
■
■
develop a global counterterrorism relationship with India;
■
■
further incentivize India to sign defense cooperation agreements,
including the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA), the Communi
-
cations Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA);
■
■
advocate much more actively for India’s long-pending request for
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum and in the global nonproliferation regimes; and
■
■
vigorously support India’s “Act East” policy to strengthen its power
projection and influence into Southeast and East Asia.
■
■
Southeast Asia
:
ASEAN nations are a primary target of China’s geo
-
economic coercion, not least regarding issues in the South China
Sea. The United States should
■
■
push harder for meaningful defense reform within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to develop a full range of defense capabili
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ties that would enable the government to deter and prevent intru
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sions on or possible invasion of Philippine territory;
■
■
boost Indonesia’s role in joint exercises and expand its scope, sym
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bolically indicative of Jakarta’s growing centrality to security in the
Asia Pacific, and gear military aid, training, and joint exercises with
Indonesia toward air-sea capabilities;
54
■
■
help Singapore upgrade its current air force capabilities from F-16s
to F-35s;
■
■
encourage Malaysia to fully participate in the Proliferation Secu
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rity Initiative, which it agreed to join in April 2014, and promote
more active Malaysian involvement in combined exercises, domain
awareness architectures, and the like;
■
■
seek to expand the scope of activities during the annual U.S.-
Vietnam naval exercises to include joint humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and/or search and rescue exercises, and make
more frequent stops at the port at Cam Ranh Bay in the short term;
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■
■
establish strategic International Military Exchange Training (IMET)
programs with Myanmar, with a focus on professionalizing the
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Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
military, and continue to integrate the Myanmar military into, and
expand its participation in, joint international military exercises;
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■
■
advocate substantial IMET expansion throughout Southeast Asia;
and
■
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help build domestic democratic political capacity throughout the
region.
■
■
Taiwan:
A comprehensive, durable, and unofficial relationship
between Taiwan and the United States should be a feature of an
invigorated U.S. grand strategy toward China, including through
the legislative framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The
United States should reaffirm its military commitment to Taiwan
by upholding TRA obligations to “provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character.” Possible future arms sales to Taiwan could
include signals intelligence aircraft, transport aircraft, upgraded
engines for F-16s, upgrades to frigates and other ships, and/or land-
based missile defense systems.
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energize HigH
-le
Vel d
iPlOMacy
wit
H b
eijing
The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China to
attempt to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two nations
pursue mutually incompatible grand strategies, and to reassure U.S.
allies and friends in Asia and beyond that Washington is doing every
-
thing it can to avoid a confrontation with Beijing.
Despite the destabilizing objectives of China’s grand strategy in Asia
and in the context of implementing the many policy recommendations
in this report to systemically strengthen the American response to the
rise of Chinese power, the United States bears major responsibilities
to promote international stability, prosperity, and peace—in Asia and
across the globe.
In this context, take into account the negative consequences for each
country’s formidable domestic challenges if the United States and
China seriously mismanage their relationship. Imagine the tumultuous
effects on the global economy. Consider the dramatic increase in ten
-
sion throughout Asia and the fact that no country in this vast region
wants to have to choose between China and the United States. Envision
the corrosive impact on U.S.-China collaboration on climate change.
Picture the fallout over attempts to deal with the nuclear weapons pro
-
grams of North Korea and Iran.
With this in mind, the U.S.-China discourse should be more
candid, high level, and private than current practice—no rows of offi-
cials principally trading sermons across the table in Washington or
Beijing. Bureaucracies wish to do today what they did yesterday, and
wish to do tomorrow what they did today. It is, therefore, inevitable
that representatives from Washington and Beijing routinely mount
bills of indictment regarding the other side. All are familiar with these
calcified and endlessly repeated talking points. As the Chinese prov
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erb puts it, “To talk much and arrive nowhere is the same as climbing
a tree to catch a fish.”
For such an intensified high-level bilateral dialogue between Wash
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ington and Beijing to be fruitful, it should avoid concentrating primar
-
ily on the alleged perfidious behavior of the other side. For instance,
no amount of American condemnation of China’s human rights prac
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tices—private or by megaphone—will consequentially affect Beijing’s
policies, including toward Hong Kong, and no degree of Chinese com
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plaints will lead the United States to weaken its alliance systems that
are indispensable to the protection of its vital national interests. Nor
is it likely that either side will admit to its actual grand strategy toward
the other. In any case, endemic contention will over time contribute to
a systemic worsening of U.S.-China bilateral relations that results in all
the destructive consequences enumerated earlier.
Instead, after thorough consultations with its Asian allies, the United
States should commit to working with China on two or three issues that
would make a positive contribution to bilateral ties and to international
peace and security. After the November 2014 U.S.-China summit in
Beijing, Asian security would be good subject with which to begin. For
example, subjects for joint exploration could include the possibility of
creating a version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe for Asia, expanding the talks on North Korea to include broader
Asian security issues, or agreeing on enhanced security confidence-
building measures between the two sides. To inspire fresh thinking and
creative policy initiatives, it might be best if the senior individuals to
take the lead in these talks were not in the direct national security chain
of command.
Bipartisan candidates for such a U.S. team include Thomas Donilon,
former Obama national security advisor, and Robert Zoellick, former
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Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
World Bank president and George W. Bush administration policy
-
maker. The Chinese side would have similar credentials and all these
individuals would, of course, need the confidence of their respective
leaders. Such a channel would simply recognize the reality that the two
countries’ strategic policies are being primarily designed not by foreign
and defense ministries, but by those close to each president and by the
presidents themselves, and that the current means of bilateral interac
-
tion are not adequate for the task.
34
Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed
in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some will
argue that China has no grand strategy. Although there may be those in
Beijing who disagree with China’s current strategic approach, its domi
-
nating elements are not a mystery. Chinese officials insistently argue
that the U.S. alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and
should be dismantled; that the United States’ Asian allies and friends
should loosen their U.S. ties and that failure to do so will inevitably pro
-
duce a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current
presence and power in Asia are dimensions of an American attempt
to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that
U.S. military power projection in the region is dangerous and should be
reduced (even as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities
with the clear objective of reducing U.S. military options in the context
of a U.S.-China confrontation); and that the U.S. economic model is
fundamentally exploitative and should have no application in Asia. To
not take seriously official Chinese government statements along these
lines is to not take China seriously. That Beijing does not hope to real
-
ize these policy goals in the short term does not reduce their potential
undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if China were to
achieve the policy objectives contained in these official statements, it
would clearly replace the United States as Asia’s leading power. If that
does not represent a PRC grand strategy, what would?
Second, some may say that the analysis and policy recommenda-
tions in this report are too pessimistic, based on a worst-case appraisal
of Chinese behavior. To the contrary, we draw our conclusions from
China’s current actions regarding its internal and external security, its
neighbors, and U.S. presence in Asia. We project nothing that is not
already apparent in China’s present policies and strategic intentions.
Nevertheless, this hardly represents the worst case if China began to
Conclusion
35
Conclusion
behave like the Soviet Union, necessitating something far more costly
than balancing. The word “containment” comes to mind, and we cer
-
tainly do not recommend that vis-à-vis China in current circumstances,
not least because no Asian nation would join in such an endeavor.
Other policymakers might argue that China’s international behav
-
ior is “normal” for a rising power, that China is gradually being social
-
ized into the international system and it is far too early for Washington
to give up on comprehensive cooperation and strategic reassurance
toward Beijing.
The issue here is how long the United States should
pursue a policy toward China that is clearly not sufficiently protect
-
ing U.S. vital national interests. Although Beijing has in general acted
responsibly in the international lending institutions and may be slowly
moving toward progress on difficult issues (such as climate change),
Kurt Campbell, former State Department assistant secretary for
East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration, recently
stressed, “We were always looking for deeper cooperation with China
and attempts to have on-the-ground cooperation—for example, on aid
or humanitarian support operations, we weren’t able to bring about;
in military-to-military relations, on the diplomatic agenda, on aid, we
found it very difficult to get meaningful results.”
58
“Meaningful results” have been so difficult to achieve in the U.S.-
China relationship precisely because China seeks to replace the United
States as the leading power in Asia. And although Chinese behavior
may be “normal” for a rising nation, that does not diminish China’s
overall negative impact on the balance of power in the vast Indo-Pacific
region; nor does it reduce the crucial requirement for Washington to
develop policies that meet this challenge of the rise of Chinese power
and thwart Beijing’s objective to systematically undermine American
strategic primacy in Asia.
Fourth, some may assert that China’s integration into the interna-
tional system broadly serves important U.S. purposes, binds Beijing to a
rules-based system and increases the costs to the PRC of going against it,
and thus should trump other U.S. concerns about China’s internal and
external behavior. We accept that integrating China into international
institutions will continue and that the United States will accrue some
benefits from that activity. Our argument is that basing U.S. grand strat
-
egy primarily on such Chinese global integration ignores the strategic
reality that China has made far greater relative gains through such pro
-
cesses than the United States has over the past three decades, that China
36
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
has accordingly increased its national power in ways that potentially
deeply threaten U.S. national interests in the long term, and that there-
fore the United States needs to understand and internalize this disturb
-
ing fact and respond to such PRC international assimilation with much
more robust American policies and power projection into Asia.
Fifth, critics may also say that the United States’ Asian allies and
friends will never go along with the grand strategy outlined in this
document.
This concern seems to concentrate not on the merits of
our strategic approach, but rather on its reception in the region. In
any case, what the allies want is not to cut ties with China, but rather
increased U.S. capabilities in the region, increased reassurance of
American protection, and increased U.S. support for their own eco
-
nomic growth and security. The grand strategy outlined in this report
advances all of these objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate
the current anxiety among virtually all Asian nations about the strate-
gic implications of the rise of Chinese power, recent examples of PRC
aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, and the conviction
that only the United States can successfully deter Beijing’s corro
-
sive strategic ambitions. Because of PRC behavior, Asian states have
already begun to balance against China through greater intra-Asian
cooperation—actions that are entirely consistent with and only rein
-
force our U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, the worry across Asia today is
not that the United States will pursue overly robust policies toward
China; rather, it is that Washington is insufficiently aware of Beijing’s
ultimate disruptive strategic goals in Asia, is periodically attracted to
a G2 formula, and may not be up to the challenge of effectively deal
-
ing with the rise of China over the long term. These deeply worried
views across Asian governments are fertile ground on which to plant a
revised U.S. grand strategy toward China.
Moreover, a close examination of the specific policy prescriptions
in this study reveal few that would not be welcomed by the individ
-
ual nations of Asia to which they apply. Although this major course
correction by the United States toward China would not gain allied
endorsement overnight, with sustained and resolute U.S. presidential
leadership and the immense leverage the United States has with its
Asian allies and friends, this is not too steep a strategic hill to climb,
especially given the profound U.S. national interests at stake across
Asia. Finally, nothing in this grand strategy requires the United
States and its allies to diminish their current economic and political
37
Conclusion
cooperation with China. Rather, the emphasis is on developing those
U.S. and allied components that are ultimately necessary to make this
cooperation sustainable. In other words, if the balance of power alters
fundamentally, U.S. and Asian economic cooperation with China
could not be maintained.
Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond
to the U.S. grand strategy recommended here. Are not the risks of
pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a
strong Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relation
-
ship, including fewer meetings among senior officials, little progress
on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American busi
-
ness in China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in
societal interchange, and perhaps fewer Chinese students in American
universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to
the measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond
holdings because of the consequential reduction in their value.) These
steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital
U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to
reacting rhetorically, the more aggressive Beijing’s policy response and
the more coercive its actions, the more likely that America’s friends and
allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think
that China will find an easy solution to this dilemma.
Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate
with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national
interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change,
counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea,
and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chi
-
nese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition—
would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation
around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy
toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing
because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of domi
-
nating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security
Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international
collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there
are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamen
-
tal policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that
are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the
rise of Chinese power.
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Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
In any case, there is no reason why a China that did not seek to over
-
turn the balance of power in Asia should object to the policy prescrip
-
tions contained in this report. And which of the policy prescriptions
would those who wish to continue the current prevailing U.S. approach
to China—that is, cooperation—reject? In short, these measures do not
“treat China as an enemy” as some American analysts rightfully warn
against; rather, they seek to protect vital U.S. and allied national inter
-
ests, a reasonable and responsible objective.
Washington simply cannot have it both ways—to accommodate
Chinese concerns regarding U.S. power projection into Asia through
“strategic reassurance” and at the same time to promote and defend
U.S. vital national interests in this vast region. It is, of course, the
second that must be at the core of a successful U.S. grand strategy
toward China.
In this same sense, there is no real prospect of building fundamen
-
tal trust, “peaceful coexistence,” “mutual understanding,” a strategic
partnership, or a “new type of major country relations” between the
United States and China. Rather, the most that can be hoped for is cau
-
tion and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China
strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be
no easy task to achieve in the period ahead. The purpose of U.S. diplo
-
macy in these dangerous circumstances is to mitigate and manage the
severe inherent tensions between these two conflicting strategic para-
digms, but it cannot hope to eliminate them. Former Australian Prime
Minister and distinguished sinologist Kevin Rudd believes the Chinese
may have come to the same conclusion: “There is emerging evidence
to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun
to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and
Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental
change in the relationship.”
59
The Obama administration has clearly pursued a policy approach
far different than the one recommended in this report. To be clear,
this involves a more fundamental issue than policy implementation.
All signs suggest that President Obama and his senior colleagues have
a profoundly different and much more benign diagnosis of China’s
strategic objectives in Asia than do we. Like some of its predecessors,
the Obama administration has not appeared to understand and digest
the reality that China’s grand strategy in Asia in this era is designed to
39
Conclusion
undermine U.S. vital national interests and that it has been somewhat
successful in that regard. It is for this overriding reason that the Obama
team has continued the cooperate-but-hedge policy of its predecessors,
but with much greater emphasis on cooperating than on hedging.
Many of these omissions in U.S. policy would seem to stem from
an administration worried that such actions would offend Beijing and
therefore damage the possibility of enduring strategic cooperation
between the two nations, thus the dominating emphasis on coopera-
tion. That self-defeating preoccupation by the United States based on
a long-term goal of U.S.-China strategic partnership that cannot be
accomplished in the foreseeable future should end.
The profound test that the rise of Chinese power represents for
the United States is likely to last for decades. It is unrealistic to imagine
that China’s grand strategy toward the United States will evolve in a
way—at least in the next ten years—that accepts American power and
influence as linchpins of Asian peace and security, rather than seeks to
systematically diminish them. Thus, the central question concerning
the future of Asia is whether the United States will have the political
will; the geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic capabilities; and, cru
-
cially, the right grand strategy to deal with China to protect vital U.S.
national interests.
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy
Toward China
One comment: China as it is now
cannot become a part of a world liberalism.
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
system should be resisted and met with a unified response by the
industrial democracies, led by the United States. Washington should
continue to press Beijing to bring China’s currency in line with its
actual market value.
■
■
Fashion effective policies to deal with China’s pervasive use of geoeco
-
nomic tools in Asia and beyond.
Never in history has one government
so directly controlled so much wealth as does the leadership of China.
It is not surprising, then, that as China’s economic might has grown,
so has its ability and inclination to use this power to advance geopo
-
litical ends. China is often correctly described as the world’s leading
practitioner of geoeconomics. For the purposes of this report, geo
-
economics is defined as “the use of economic instruments for geopo
-
litical objectives.”
43
This has been reflected in coercive geoeconomic
Chinese policies toward Japan, ASEAN nations, and Australia,
among others, with no serious U.S. policy response. A geoeconomic
foreign policy approach would entail these initiatives:
■
■
U.S.-Asian alliances should be rebooted for offensive and defen
-
sive geoeconomic action. This intensified alliance focus should
be as concentrated on geoeconomics as on political-military
instruments.
■
■
The administration should construct a geoeconomic policy to deal
with China over the long term, using the strength and positive
power of the U.S. economy, innovation, and networks to attract
Asian nations; and deal with the PRC’s coercive pressure on its
neighbors, in ways that are always consistent with an international
rules-based system that is so obviously in the national interest of
the United States and its friends and allies.
■
■
The U.S. energy revolution should be converted into lasting geo
-
political gains in Asia by eliminating constraints on supplying U.S.
allies and friends with gas and oil.
■
■
Create, in partnership with U.S. allies and like-minded partners, a new
technology-control regime vis-à-vis beijing.
Washington should pay
increased attention to limiting China’s access to advanced weap
-
onry and militarily critical technologies. Although the United States
certainly should lead the West in expanding international trade,
this policy ought not to be extended to the point where it actually
undermines American power and erodes Washington’s ability to
25
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
discharge its fundamental obligation to guarantee Asian and global
security and meet the Chinese challenge. The virtues of enhanced
trade with China “must not obscure the reality that deepening glo
-
balization increases Beijing’s access to sophisticated weaponry and
its associated elements,” including through dual-use technologies.
44
Such acquisitions can undermine any American success in balancing
China’s rise with decisive and dangerous consequences.
Today, such capabilities obviously do not reside solely in the United
States—they can be found in many nations, especially Washington’s
European and Asian allies. The United States should encourage these
countries to develop a coordinated approach to constrict China’s
access to all technologies, including dual use, that can inflict “high-
leverage strategic harm.”
45
To establish a new technology regime
toward China, Washington should enter into an immediate discus
-
sion with allies and friends with the aim of tightening restrictions on
the sales of militarily critical technologies to China, including dual-
use technologies. This will obviously not be easy to accomplish, but
the effort should get under way immediately.
Strengt
Hen t
He u.S. Military
The United States should invest in defense capabilities and capacity
specifically to defeat China’s emerging anti-access capabilities and
permit successful U.S. power projection even against concerted oppo
-
sition from Beijing.
At present, the Obama administration’s military component to
strengthen U.S. power projection in Asia is small: adding a fourth attack
submarine to Guam; rotating 2,500 marines to Darwin, Australia;
putting a small number of littoral combat ships in Singapore; making
minor improvements in technology, intelligence, and missile defense;
and increasing U.S. naval forces in Asia from 50 percent to 60 percent
over the long term.
46
No nation in Asia, least of all China, will take seriously U.S. mili
-
tary enhancement in Asia unless the United States takes the following
vigorous and comprehensive steps:
■
■
Congress should remove sequestration caps and substantially
increase the U.S. defense budget.
47
26
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■
■
The White House should work with Congress on thoughtful, mean
-
ingful reform of the defense budget and force design. Absent that,
the internal cost drivers (compensation and entitlements) within the
budget will outpace any reasonable increase to the budget.
■
■
The existing nuclear balance between the United States and China
should be maintained, as it is crucial to the U.S. posture in Asia.
■
■
Washington should accelerate U.S. military capabilities to coun
-
ter China’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) programs, especially
in those areas where the United States retains advantage, such as
stealthy long-range unmanned vehicles and undersea warfare.
■
■
Washington should reiterate its insistence on freedom of navigation
and overflight, including in exclusive economic zones, for military as
well as civilian ships and planes, and challenge Beijing appropriately
if those norms are violated.
■
■
Washington should build military capability and capacity to increase
interoperability with allies and partners in Asia to include aiding the
regional states to develop their own A2/AD capabilities against China.
■
■
Washington should accelerate the U.S. ballistic missile defense
posture and network in the Pacific to support allies, among other
objectives.
■
■
Washington should enhance efforts to protect its space domain
while developing an aerial alternative to space for high-volume
communications.
■
■
Washington should intensify a consistent U.S. naval and air presence
in the South and East China Seas.
■
■
Washington should increase the frequency and duration of naval
exercises with South China Sea littoral states.
iMP
leMent effecti
Ve cyber P
Olicie
S
For the past decade, the United States has tolerated incessant cyber
-
attacks by China on the U.S. government, critical infrastructure, and
businesses. Virtually nothing has been done to stop this cyber assault,
and the “name and shame” approach toward China has clearly failed.
(The U.S. indictment of five PLA officers, of course, had no impact on
China’s cyber espionage.) The Department of Defense cyber strategy
27
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
published in 2011 announced a new doctrine, arguing that harmful
action within the cyber domain can be met with a parallel response
in another domain, known as equivalence.
48
No such equivalence has
been exacted on China. Such passivity on the part of the United States
should end, especially since there is no way to reach a verifiable cyberse-
curity agreement with China. The United States should implement the
following cyber policies:
■
■
Impose costs on China that are in excess of the benefits it receives
from its violations in cyberspace. A good starting point is the recom
-
mendation of the Blair-Huntsman Commission of an across-the-
board tariff on Chinese goods.
49
■
■
Increase U.S. offensive cyber capabilities to dissuade China’s leaders
from using cyberattacks against the United States and its partners in
the region.
■
■
Continue to improve U.S. cyber defenses. Securing cyberspace will
require congressional action, including a law regulating information
sharing between intelligence agencies and the corporate world.
■
■
Pass relevant legislation in Congress, such as the Cyber Information
Security Protection Act, allowing businesses to rapidly share intel
-
ligence on cyber threats with each other and the government without
fear of lawsuits.
reinfOrce i
ndO
-Pacific Partner
SH
iPS
The United States should reinforce a new web of partnerships through
-
out Asia that includes traditional U.S. alliances but goes beyond them,
pursuing as an explicit policy the objectives of both strengthening
Asian states to cope with China independently and building new forms
of intra-Asian strategic cooperation that do not always involve, but will
be systematically supported by, the United States.
The United States cannot defend its national interests in Asia with
-
out sustained support from its allies and friends. In one way or another,
the PRC seeks to undermine each of these crucial bilateral relationships
to test American strength and resilience in defending and promot
-
ing these ties in Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia. The first step
in combating these corrosive Chinese efforts is to recognize that they
28
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
are occurring; the second is to develop strategies to defeat them. At the
same time, it is essential that Washington constantly reassure its demo
-
cratic partners in Asia that it seeks to avoid a confrontation with China
and that the steps delineated below are prudent in order to maintain the
existing balance of power and to protect Western national interests in
the Indo-Pacific.
■
■
japan:
No other U.S. relationship approaches that with Japan in
maintaining the current balance in Asia and dealing with the rise
of Chinese power. Indeed, without close and enduring U.S.-Japan
security cooperation, it is difficult to see how the United States could
maintain its present power and influence in Asia. Thus, as Japan con
-
tinues to emerge from its post–World War II self-imposed security
constraints, the United States should continually support this crucial
alliance partner by
■
■
substantially expanding its security relationship with Japan, encom
-
passing all of Asia;
■
■
helping upgrade the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), includ
-
ing Japan’s capabilities for joint/combined-arms/amphibious
operations;
■
■
aligning concepts such as air-sea battle and dynamic defense
through a dialogue with Japan on roles, missions, and capabilities;
50
■
■
reinvigorating an extended deterrence dialogue with Japan;
■
■
intensifying ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with
Japan;
■
■
signaling more often that Japan remains fully and reliably under a
U.S. security umbrella;
■
■
supporting Japan’s cooperation with Vietnam, Australia, India, and
other nations concerned with the rise of Chinese power; and
■
■
allowing liquefied natural gas exports to Japan.
■
■
South korea
:
The U.S. strategic relationship with the Republic of
Korea (ROK) is essential to maintaining the balance of power in Asia.
In that context, these bilateral ties should be reinforced by
■
■
ensuring adequate military capabilities are present on the Korean
peninsula in the context of provocations from North Korea;
■
■
working with the ROK (and Japan) to develop a comprehensive
strategy for regime change in North Korea;
29
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■
■
formulating with Seoul a shared vision for dealing with Korean
unification;
■
■
boosting the credibility of U.S.-extended nuclear guarantees to
South Korea;
■
■
increasing support for the ROK’s BMD capabilities; and
■
■
encouraging the ROK to eventually join the TPP.
■
■
Australia:
Australia is the southern anchor of U.S. relationships in
the Pacific and, as a nation facing the Indian and Pacific Oceans, an
essential link in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. The United States and
Australia should cooperate to achieve the following goals:
■
■
The United States should use the Stirling naval base near Perth to
support increased U.S. naval force structure in the region.
■
■
The United States should immediately accelerate cyber, space, and
undersea cooperation with Australia.
■
■
The United States and Australia should jointly deploy surveillance
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles on the Cocos Islands (Aus
-
tralian territory) in the Indian Ocean.
■
■
The two countries should work together to more rapidly identify
potential Australian contributions to ballistic missile defense.
■
■
The scope and frequency of Australia’s hosting of rotational
deployments of U.S. military personnel should be increased.
51
■
■
The U.S.-Australia free trade agreement should be upgraded, par
-
ticularly as Australia progresses toward FTAs with Japan, Korea,
and China.
52
Similarly, Australia should be included in the TPP.
■
■
Washington should support Australia’s efforts to expand its strate-
gic interaction with like-minded Asian nations.
■
■
india:
Especially in the face of an increasingly assertive China, the
United States benefits from the presence of a robust democratic
power that is willing to and capable of independently balancing Bei
-
jing’s rising influence in Asia.
53
The United States should
■
■
substantially loosen its restraints on military technology transfer
to India;
■
■
regard Indian nuclear weapons as an asset in maintaining the cur
-
rent balance of power in Asia;
■
■
markedly increase U.S.-India military-to-military cooperation,
especially between the two navies;
30
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
■
■
systemically assist India in building maritime capabilities in the
Indian Ocean and beyond, including through substantial technol
-
ogy transfer;
■
■
develop a global counterterrorism relationship with India;
■
■
further incentivize India to sign defense cooperation agreements,
including the Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA), the Communi
-
cations Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA);
■
■
advocate much more actively for India’s long-pending request for
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum and in the global nonproliferation regimes; and
■
■
vigorously support India’s “Act East” policy to strengthen its power
projection and influence into Southeast and East Asia.
■
■
Southeast Asia
:
ASEAN nations are a primary target of China’s geo
-
economic coercion, not least regarding issues in the South China
Sea. The United States should
■
■
push harder for meaningful defense reform within the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to develop a full range of defense capabili
-
ties that would enable the government to deter and prevent intru
-
sions on or possible invasion of Philippine territory;
■
■
boost Indonesia’s role in joint exercises and expand its scope, sym
-
bolically indicative of Jakarta’s growing centrality to security in the
Asia Pacific, and gear military aid, training, and joint exercises with
Indonesia toward air-sea capabilities;
54
■
■
help Singapore upgrade its current air force capabilities from F-16s
to F-35s;
■
■
encourage Malaysia to fully participate in the Proliferation Secu
-
rity Initiative, which it agreed to join in April 2014, and promote
more active Malaysian involvement in combined exercises, domain
awareness architectures, and the like;
■
■
seek to expand the scope of activities during the annual U.S.-
Vietnam naval exercises to include joint humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief, and/or search and rescue exercises, and make
more frequent stops at the port at Cam Ranh Bay in the short term;
55
■
■
establish strategic International Military Exchange Training (IMET)
programs with Myanmar, with a focus on professionalizing the
31
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
military, and continue to integrate the Myanmar military into, and
expand its participation in, joint international military exercises;
56
■
■
advocate substantial IMET expansion throughout Southeast Asia;
and
■
■
help build domestic democratic political capacity throughout the
region.
■
■
Taiwan:
A comprehensive, durable, and unofficial relationship
between Taiwan and the United States should be a feature of an
invigorated U.S. grand strategy toward China, including through
the legislative framework of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The
United States should reaffirm its military commitment to Taiwan
by upholding TRA obligations to “provide Taiwan with arms of a
defensive character.” Possible future arms sales to Taiwan could
include signals intelligence aircraft, transport aircraft, upgraded
engines for F-16s, upgrades to frigates and other ships, and/or land-
based missile defense systems.
57
energize HigH
-le
Vel d
iPlOMacy
wit
H b
eijing
The United States should energize high-level diplomacy with China to
attempt to mitigate the inherently profound tensions as the two nations
pursue mutually incompatible grand strategies, and to reassure U.S.
allies and friends in Asia and beyond that Washington is doing every
-
thing it can to avoid a confrontation with Beijing.
Despite the destabilizing objectives of China’s grand strategy in Asia
and in the context of implementing the many policy recommendations
in this report to systemically strengthen the American response to the
rise of Chinese power, the United States bears major responsibilities
to promote international stability, prosperity, and peace—in Asia and
across the globe.
In this context, take into account the negative consequences for each
country’s formidable domestic challenges if the United States and
China seriously mismanage their relationship. Imagine the tumultuous
effects on the global economy. Consider the dramatic increase in ten
-
sion throughout Asia and the fact that no country in this vast region
wants to have to choose between China and the United States. Envision
the corrosive impact on U.S.-China collaboration on climate change.
Picture the fallout over attempts to deal with the nuclear weapons pro
-
grams of North Korea and Iran.
With this in mind, the U.S.-China discourse should be more
candid, high level, and private than current practice—no rows of offi-
cials principally trading sermons across the table in Washington or
Beijing. Bureaucracies wish to do today what they did yesterday, and
wish to do tomorrow what they did today. It is, therefore, inevitable
that representatives from Washington and Beijing routinely mount
bills of indictment regarding the other side. All are familiar with these
calcified and endlessly repeated talking points. As the Chinese prov
-
erb puts it, “To talk much and arrive nowhere is the same as climbing
a tree to catch a fish.”
For such an intensified high-level bilateral dialogue between Wash
-
ington and Beijing to be fruitful, it should avoid concentrating primar
-
ily on the alleged perfidious behavior of the other side. For instance,
no amount of American condemnation of China’s human rights prac
-
tices—private or by megaphone—will consequentially affect Beijing’s
policies, including toward Hong Kong, and no degree of Chinese com
-
plaints will lead the United States to weaken its alliance systems that
are indispensable to the protection of its vital national interests. Nor
is it likely that either side will admit to its actual grand strategy toward
the other. In any case, endemic contention will over time contribute to
a systemic worsening of U.S.-China bilateral relations that results in all
the destructive consequences enumerated earlier.
Instead, after thorough consultations with its Asian allies, the United
States should commit to working with China on two or three issues that
would make a positive contribution to bilateral ties and to international
peace and security. After the November 2014 U.S.-China summit in
Beijing, Asian security would be good subject with which to begin. For
example, subjects for joint exploration could include the possibility of
creating a version of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe for Asia, expanding the talks on North Korea to include broader
Asian security issues, or agreeing on enhanced security confidence-
building measures between the two sides. To inspire fresh thinking and
creative policy initiatives, it might be best if the senior individuals to
take the lead in these talks were not in the direct national security chain
of command.
Bipartisan candidates for such a U.S. team include Thomas Donilon,
former Obama national security advisor, and Robert Zoellick, former
33
Recommendations for U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
World Bank president and George W. Bush administration policy
-
maker. The Chinese side would have similar credentials and all these
individuals would, of course, need the confidence of their respective
leaders. Such a channel would simply recognize the reality that the two
countries’ strategic policies are being primarily designed not by foreign
and defense ministries, but by those close to each president and by the
presidents themselves, and that the current means of bilateral interac
-
tion are not adequate for the task.
34
Policy experts critical of the grand strategy toward China proposed
in this report will likely fall into at least six categories. First, some will
argue that China has no grand strategy. Although there may be those in
Beijing who disagree with China’s current strategic approach, its domi
-
nating elements are not a mystery. Chinese officials insistently argue
that the U.S. alliance system in Asia is a product of the Cold War and
should be dismantled; that the United States’ Asian allies and friends
should loosen their U.S. ties and that failure to do so will inevitably pro
-
duce a negative PRC reaction; that U.S. efforts to maintain its current
presence and power in Asia are dimensions of an American attempt
to contain China and therefore must be condemned and resisted; that
U.S. military power projection in the region is dangerous and should be
reduced (even as the PLA continues to build up its military capabilities
with the clear objective of reducing U.S. military options in the context
of a U.S.-China confrontation); and that the U.S. economic model is
fundamentally exploitative and should have no application in Asia. To
not take seriously official Chinese government statements along these
lines is to not take China seriously. That Beijing does not hope to real
-
ize these policy goals in the short term does not reduce their potential
undermining effect in the decades ahead. In short, if China were to
achieve the policy objectives contained in these official statements, it
would clearly replace the United States as Asia’s leading power. If that
does not represent a PRC grand strategy, what would?
Second, some may say that the analysis and policy recommenda-
tions in this report are too pessimistic, based on a worst-case appraisal
of Chinese behavior. To the contrary, we draw our conclusions from
China’s current actions regarding its internal and external security, its
neighbors, and U.S. presence in Asia. We project nothing that is not
already apparent in China’s present policies and strategic intentions.
Nevertheless, this hardly represents the worst case if China began to
Conclusion
35
Conclusion
behave like the Soviet Union, necessitating something far more costly
than balancing. The word “containment” comes to mind, and we cer
-
tainly do not recommend that vis-à-vis China in current circumstances,
not least because no Asian nation would join in such an endeavor.
Other policymakers might argue that China’s international behav
-
ior is “normal” for a rising power, that China is gradually being social
-
ized into the international system and it is far too early for Washington
to give up on comprehensive cooperation and strategic reassurance
toward Beijing.
The issue here is how long the United States should
pursue a policy toward China that is clearly not sufficiently protect
-
ing U.S. vital national interests. Although Beijing has in general acted
responsibly in the international lending institutions and may be slowly
moving toward progress on difficult issues (such as climate change),
Kurt Campbell, former State Department assistant secretary for
East Asian and Pacific affairs in the Obama administration, recently
stressed, “We were always looking for deeper cooperation with China
and attempts to have on-the-ground cooperation—for example, on aid
or humanitarian support operations, we weren’t able to bring about;
in military-to-military relations, on the diplomatic agenda, on aid, we
found it very difficult to get meaningful results.”
58
“Meaningful results” have been so difficult to achieve in the U.S.-
China relationship precisely because China seeks to replace the United
States as the leading power in Asia. And although Chinese behavior
may be “normal” for a rising nation, that does not diminish China’s
overall negative impact on the balance of power in the vast Indo-Pacific
region; nor does it reduce the crucial requirement for Washington to
develop policies that meet this challenge of the rise of Chinese power
and thwart Beijing’s objective to systematically undermine American
strategic primacy in Asia.
Fourth, some may assert that China’s integration into the interna-
tional system broadly serves important U.S. purposes, binds Beijing to a
rules-based system and increases the costs to the PRC of going against it,
and thus should trump other U.S. concerns about China’s internal and
external behavior. We accept that integrating China into international
institutions will continue and that the United States will accrue some
benefits from that activity. Our argument is that basing U.S. grand strat
-
egy primarily on such Chinese global integration ignores the strategic
reality that China has made far greater relative gains through such pro
-
cesses than the United States has over the past three decades, that China
36
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
has accordingly increased its national power in ways that potentially
deeply threaten U.S. national interests in the long term, and that there-
fore the United States needs to understand and internalize this disturb
-
ing fact and respond to such PRC international assimilation with much
more robust American policies and power projection into Asia.
Fifth, critics may also say that the United States’ Asian allies and
friends will never go along with the grand strategy outlined in this
document.
This concern seems to concentrate not on the merits of
our strategic approach, but rather on its reception in the region. In
any case, what the allies want is not to cut ties with China, but rather
increased U.S. capabilities in the region, increased reassurance of
American protection, and increased U.S. support for their own eco
-
nomic growth and security. The grand strategy outlined in this report
advances all of these objectives. Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate
the current anxiety among virtually all Asian nations about the strate-
gic implications of the rise of Chinese power, recent examples of PRC
aggressiveness in the East and South China Seas, and the conviction
that only the United States can successfully deter Beijing’s corro
-
sive strategic ambitions. Because of PRC behavior, Asian states have
already begun to balance against China through greater intra-Asian
cooperation—actions that are entirely consistent with and only rein
-
force our U.S. grand strategy. Indeed, the worry across Asia today is
not that the United States will pursue overly robust policies toward
China; rather, it is that Washington is insufficiently aware of Beijing’s
ultimate disruptive strategic goals in Asia, is periodically attracted to
a G2 formula, and may not be up to the challenge of effectively deal
-
ing with the rise of China over the long term. These deeply worried
views across Asian governments are fertile ground on which to plant a
revised U.S. grand strategy toward China.
Moreover, a close examination of the specific policy prescriptions
in this study reveal few that would not be welcomed by the individ
-
ual nations of Asia to which they apply. Although this major course
correction by the United States toward China would not gain allied
endorsement overnight, with sustained and resolute U.S. presidential
leadership and the immense leverage the United States has with its
Asian allies and friends, this is not too steep a strategic hill to climb,
especially given the profound U.S. national interests at stake across
Asia. Finally, nothing in this grand strategy requires the United
States and its allies to diminish their current economic and political
37
Conclusion
cooperation with China. Rather, the emphasis is on developing those
U.S. and allied components that are ultimately necessary to make this
cooperation sustainable. In other words, if the balance of power alters
fundamentally, U.S. and Asian economic cooperation with China
could not be maintained.
Finally, the question arises regarding how China will respond
to the U.S. grand strategy recommended here. Are not the risks of
pursuing this grand strategy too great? One could certainly expect a
strong Chinese reaction and a sustained chill in the bilateral relation
-
ship, including fewer meetings among senior officials, little progress
on bilateral economic issues, less opportunities for American busi
-
ness in China, reduced military-to-military interaction, a reduction in
societal interchange, and perhaps fewer Chinese students in American
universities. (We dismiss the likelihood that China would respond to
the measures recommended in this report by selling off its U.S. bond
holdings because of the consequential reduction in their value.) These
steps by Beijing would not be trivial but also would not threaten vital
U.S. national interests. If China went further in its policy as opposed to
reacting rhetorically, the more aggressive Beijing’s policy response and
the more coercive its actions, the more likely that America’s friends and
allies in Asia would move even closer to Washington. We do not think
that China will find an easy solution to this dilemma.
Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate
with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national
interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change,
counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea,
and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chi
-
nese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition—
would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation
around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy
toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing
because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of domi
-
nating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security
Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international
collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there
are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamen
-
tal policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that
are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the
rise of Chinese power.
38
Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China
In any case, there is no reason why a China that did not seek to over
-
turn the balance of power in Asia should object to the policy prescrip
-
tions contained in this report. And which of the policy prescriptions
would those who wish to continue the current prevailing U.S. approach
to China—that is, cooperation—reject? In short, these measures do not
“treat China as an enemy” as some American analysts rightfully warn
against; rather, they seek to protect vital U.S. and allied national inter
-
ests, a reasonable and responsible objective.
Washington simply cannot have it both ways—to accommodate
Chinese concerns regarding U.S. power projection into Asia through
“strategic reassurance” and at the same time to promote and defend
U.S. vital national interests in this vast region. It is, of course, the
second that must be at the core of a successful U.S. grand strategy
toward China.
In this same sense, there is no real prospect of building fundamen
-
tal trust, “peaceful coexistence,” “mutual understanding,” a strategic
partnership, or a “new type of major country relations” between the
United States and China. Rather, the most that can be hoped for is cau
-
tion and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China
strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be
no easy task to achieve in the period ahead. The purpose of U.S. diplo
-
macy in these dangerous circumstances is to mitigate and manage the
severe inherent tensions between these two conflicting strategic para-
digms, but it cannot hope to eliminate them. Former Australian Prime
Minister and distinguished sinologist Kevin Rudd believes the Chinese
may have come to the same conclusion: “There is emerging evidence
to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun
to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and
Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental
change in the relationship.”
59
The Obama administration has clearly pursued a policy approach
far different than the one recommended in this report. To be clear,
this involves a more fundamental issue than policy implementation.
All signs suggest that President Obama and his senior colleagues have
a profoundly different and much more benign diagnosis of China’s
strategic objectives in Asia than do we. Like some of its predecessors,
the Obama administration has not appeared to understand and digest
the reality that China’s grand strategy in Asia in this era is designed to
39
Conclusion
undermine U.S. vital national interests and that it has been somewhat
successful in that regard. It is for this overriding reason that the Obama
team has continued the cooperate-but-hedge policy of its predecessors,
but with much greater emphasis on cooperating than on hedging.
Many of these omissions in U.S. policy would seem to stem from
an administration worried that such actions would offend Beijing and
therefore damage the possibility of enduring strategic cooperation
between the two nations, thus the dominating emphasis on coopera-
tion. That self-defeating preoccupation by the United States based on
a long-term goal of U.S.-China strategic partnership that cannot be
accomplished in the foreseeable future should end.
The profound test that the rise of Chinese power represents for
the United States is likely to last for decades. It is unrealistic to imagine
that China’s grand strategy toward the United States will evolve in a
way—at least in the next ten years—that accepts American power and
influence as linchpins of Asian peace and security, rather than seeks to
systematically diminish them. Thus, the central question concerning
the future of Asia is whether the United States will have the political
will; the geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic capabilities; and, cru
-
cially, the right grand strategy to deal with China to protect vital U.S.
national interests.
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