LEHNQ Discussion Topics 08/17/2014 17:24:31 $LEHNQ
I think it is this one
http://etbfinance.blogspot.com/2014/08/lehman...er-46.html
Write to an admin, he will get restricted, if we all send a message/complaint.
Clueless$$$$$$$$$$$
All along, we've known this...
Funny how that works.
Are CTs a contract cure amount?
You're still doing great work. Like a bloodhound, hot on the trail.
http://etbfinance.blogspot.be/2014/08/lehman-...er-46.html
now you see slow disappearends of the Gus, 2 good and another bashers because there job to confused people on the board is over, they have to move to another board to bash and get paid for it by someone.
Those assholes should be hanged.
Cheers
mates
JOVI, great article. Do you have a link?
Daisy
Can I still say fellers? I know it's wrong, but it's just a habit.
nday, August 17, 2014
Lehman Creditors Recover Another $ 4.6 Billion
Thus far, unsecured creditors of failed Lehman Brothers have recovered $ 57.1 billion according to today's Wall Street Journal. This doesn't include more than $ 105 billion that was returned to customers in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Bankruptcy.
What this suggests is that, had Lehman had a path to Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it may well have managed its way through and returned as a new Lehman Brothers, rather than go through liquidation. In the 1930's, nearly a third of the banks that failed turned out to have positive net worth after liquidation, suggesting that the bank runs that put them under were purely psychological.
Similarly, it is looking more and more like what put Lehman under was psychology not economics. The collapse of Lehman's access to the repo market in October of 2008 was the precipitate cause of Lehman's bankruptcy. That is the modern form of a "run on the bank."
Normally, when companies can't pay their bills, there are two alternatives available to them (or, more accurately, to their creditors): 1) Chapter 7 bankruptcy (liquidation); or 2) Chapter 11 bankruptcy (recapitalization of the balance sheet reducing overall debt and ultimately emerging as a new company with a clean(er) balance sheet). This latter process is not available to financial service companies, mainly because no one will do business with a bankrupt financial service company.
Strangely, travelers have no hesitation flying on bankrupt airlines or shopping at bankrupt stores or gaining health care at a bankrupt hospital. But, partly by law, partly by custom, financial services entities cannot, in practice, utilize Chapter 11.
That should be changed.
There is no reason to liquidate an ongoing concern if a reorganization of the balance sheet can keep the business alive.
The current government strategy is to strangle financial service companies with regulations so that they cannot fail. That is a sure fire way to guarantee that they will fail.
Better is to provide through legislation a Chapter 11 path, so that the Lehman Brothers of the world can operate like United Airlines -- go bankrupt but emerge healthier and wiser after bankruptcy. Chapter 11 puts the onus on equity holders (who normally lose everything) and bond holders (who lose a lot but become partly bond holders and partly equity holders in the new company). The taxpayers and customers are normally spared in Chapter 11. That's the way it should be.
Quote:
2262 12/07/2009 Notice of Presentment of Stipulation and Order Between the Debtors, Trustee, Creditors Committee, Barclays Capital Inc. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. filed by Amy R. Wolf on behalf of JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. with presentment to be held on 12/11/2009 (check with court for location) Objections due by 12/11/2009, (Attachments: # (1) Stipulation and Proposed Order)(Wolf, Amy)
Case: SIPC vs. Lehman Brothers, Inc.
Related: none
Quote:
8. Barclays’ windfall was increased still further because estimates of
liabilities the Court was told Barclays would assume as part of the Asset Purchase Agreement
were, in fact, inflated. These assumed liabilities included, inter alia, Barclays’ purported
agreement to pay (i) $2 billion in employee bonuses and (ii) between $1.5 and $2.25 billion in
contract cure amounts. These assumed liabilities, which materially impacted the value of the
sale, were deliberately inflated to make it appear the deal would provide a net benefit to Lehman.
After the closing, Barclays in fact paid only about $1.738 billion of this $3.5-4.25 billion amount
that had been described to the Court.
Quote:
Hearing was in progress and indeed, after it had concluded, and (iii) approximately $2.3 billion
in OCC margin deposits purportedly added after the Sale Hearing ended. In addition, Barclays
failed to pay approximately $500 million of the bonuses it had agreed to pay, and paid only about
$238 million of the $1.5 billion in cure liabilities that the Court had been told it would likely
assume.
Quote:
38. Likewise, the estimate of cure liabilities the Court was told Barclays
would be assuming was wildly inflated. Kelly and, on information and belief, others knew the
estimate was inflated. In the end, Barclays assumed only $238 million in contract cure liabilities
out of the $2.25 billion shown on the 9/16/08 Financial Schedule and the $1.5 billion figure that
was presented to the Court as an estimate of the cure liability Barclays would assume.
39. Barclays never intended to assume anything close to $1.5 billion or $2.25
billion in the cure liabilities described to the Court.
http://insuranceclaimsbadfaith.typepad.com/fi...6-2009.pdf
http://chapter11cases.com/2014/08/17/lehman-b...btor-3884/
Excellent point!
Quote:
No, maybe what it means is, Guster and Toogood aren't getting the job done.
Thus, an emergency call to Joe Stocks. He's back.
No, maybe what it means is, Guster and Toogood aren't getting the job done.
Thus, an emergency call to Joe Stocks. He's back.
You are right. I wrote that in a previous post shortly before the Oct. 2nd date was announced. I think it has to be +/- 5 days from Sept. 30th.
Maybe they needed the profits for the coffee fund.
I was thinking 12,000 shares for a company that big isn't very much but then, these are very hard to come by nowadays. And maybe they also want to stay under the radar?
Now that was funny!
Chessman,
Good to hear you around. Post more often. You're right on the money and funny while doing it.
I think it is this one
http://etbfinance.blogspot.com/2014/08/lehman...er-46.html
Write to an admin, he will get restricted, if we all send a message/complaint.
Clueless$$$$$$$$$$$
All along, we've known this...
Funny how that works.
Are CTs a contract cure amount?
You're still doing great work. Like a bloodhound, hot on the trail.
http://etbfinance.blogspot.be/2014/08/lehman-...er-46.html
now you see slow disappearends of the Gus, 2 good and another bashers because there job to confused people on the board is over, they have to move to another board to bash and get paid for it by someone.
Those assholes should be hanged.
Cheers
mates
JOVI, great article. Do you have a link?
Daisy
Can I still say fellers? I know it's wrong, but it's just a habit.
nday, August 17, 2014
Lehman Creditors Recover Another $ 4.6 Billion
Thus far, unsecured creditors of failed Lehman Brothers have recovered $ 57.1 billion according to today's Wall Street Journal. This doesn't include more than $ 105 billion that was returned to customers in the immediate aftermath of the Lehman Bankruptcy.
What this suggests is that, had Lehman had a path to Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it may well have managed its way through and returned as a new Lehman Brothers, rather than go through liquidation. In the 1930's, nearly a third of the banks that failed turned out to have positive net worth after liquidation, suggesting that the bank runs that put them under were purely psychological.
Similarly, it is looking more and more like what put Lehman under was psychology not economics. The collapse of Lehman's access to the repo market in October of 2008 was the precipitate cause of Lehman's bankruptcy. That is the modern form of a "run on the bank."
Normally, when companies can't pay their bills, there are two alternatives available to them (or, more accurately, to their creditors): 1) Chapter 7 bankruptcy (liquidation); or 2) Chapter 11 bankruptcy (recapitalization of the balance sheet reducing overall debt and ultimately emerging as a new company with a clean(er) balance sheet). This latter process is not available to financial service companies, mainly because no one will do business with a bankrupt financial service company.
Strangely, travelers have no hesitation flying on bankrupt airlines or shopping at bankrupt stores or gaining health care at a bankrupt hospital. But, partly by law, partly by custom, financial services entities cannot, in practice, utilize Chapter 11.
That should be changed.
There is no reason to liquidate an ongoing concern if a reorganization of the balance sheet can keep the business alive.
The current government strategy is to strangle financial service companies with regulations so that they cannot fail. That is a sure fire way to guarantee that they will fail.
Better is to provide through legislation a Chapter 11 path, so that the Lehman Brothers of the world can operate like United Airlines -- go bankrupt but emerge healthier and wiser after bankruptcy. Chapter 11 puts the onus on equity holders (who normally lose everything) and bond holders (who lose a lot but become partly bond holders and partly equity holders in the new company). The taxpayers and customers are normally spared in Chapter 11. That's the way it should be.
Quote:
2262 12/07/2009 Notice of Presentment of Stipulation and Order Between the Debtors, Trustee, Creditors Committee, Barclays Capital Inc. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. filed by Amy R. Wolf on behalf of JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.. with presentment to be held on 12/11/2009 (check with court for location) Objections due by 12/11/2009, (Attachments: # (1) Stipulation and Proposed Order)(Wolf, Amy)
Case: SIPC vs. Lehman Brothers, Inc.
Related: none
Quote:
8. Barclays’ windfall was increased still further because estimates of
liabilities the Court was told Barclays would assume as part of the Asset Purchase Agreement
were, in fact, inflated. These assumed liabilities included, inter alia, Barclays’ purported
agreement to pay (i) $2 billion in employee bonuses and (ii) between $1.5 and $2.25 billion in
contract cure amounts. These assumed liabilities, which materially impacted the value of the
sale, were deliberately inflated to make it appear the deal would provide a net benefit to Lehman.
After the closing, Barclays in fact paid only about $1.738 billion of this $3.5-4.25 billion amount
that had been described to the Court.
Quote:
Hearing was in progress and indeed, after it had concluded, and (iii) approximately $2.3 billion
in OCC margin deposits purportedly added after the Sale Hearing ended. In addition, Barclays
failed to pay approximately $500 million of the bonuses it had agreed to pay, and paid only about
$238 million of the $1.5 billion in cure liabilities that the Court had been told it would likely
assume.
Quote:
38. Likewise, the estimate of cure liabilities the Court was told Barclays
would be assuming was wildly inflated. Kelly and, on information and belief, others knew the
estimate was inflated. In the end, Barclays assumed only $238 million in contract cure liabilities
out of the $2.25 billion shown on the 9/16/08 Financial Schedule and the $1.5 billion figure that
was presented to the Court as an estimate of the cure liability Barclays would assume.
39. Barclays never intended to assume anything close to $1.5 billion or $2.25
billion in the cure liabilities described to the Court.
http://insuranceclaimsbadfaith.typepad.com/fi...6-2009.pdf
http://chapter11cases.com/2014/08/17/lehman-b...btor-3884/
Excellent point!
Quote:
No, maybe what it means is, Guster and Toogood aren't getting the job done.
Thus, an emergency call to Joe Stocks. He's back.
No, maybe what it means is, Guster and Toogood aren't getting the job done.
Thus, an emergency call to Joe Stocks. He's back.
You are right. I wrote that in a previous post shortly before the Oct. 2nd date was announced. I think it has to be +/- 5 days from Sept. 30th.
Maybe they needed the profits for the coffee fund.
I was thinking 12,000 shares for a company that big isn't very much but then, these are very hard to come by nowadays. And maybe they also want to stay under the radar?
Now that was funny!
Chessman,
Good to hear you around. Post more often. You're right on the money and funny while doing it.
