Castings are rarely glamorous until nobody can get them, and Mudrick Capital is betting that ugly little industrial reality could make Doncasters worth far more in a takeover than the market currently credits. The event-driven investor, which says it owns roughly 4.3% of DPC Holdings Limited, has asked the board to quietly evaluate strategic alternatives, including a sale of the whole company. This is not the usual activist grenade tossed over the fence. Mudrick goes out of its way to praise management, the board, and the standalone plan. Still, the message is plain enough: when a few customers desperately need what you make, you at least find out what they will pay to control it.
A Bottleneck Is Worth More Than a Good Quarter
Doncasters makes precision castings and nickel- and cobalt-based superalloys used in jet engines and industrial gas turbines. That sounds like dry factory-floor stuff, but the business sits in a nasty choke point. These are not generic metal parts that a buyer can source from the next industrial park. The know-how, qualified manufacturing processes, certifications, alloy work, ceramic cores, heat treatment, inspection, and other internal capabilities took decades to assemble. Recreating that setup is not a weekend construction project, especially when specialized equipment has long lead times and new production lines chew through scrap while they learn.
Mudrick's central argument is more compelling than its headline demand. A strategic acquirer may not value Doncasters merely on the cash it generates as an independent supplier. An engine maker, gas-turbine OEM, power developer, or other capacity-hungry operator could value it for the deliveries it protects elsewhere in its own system. That distinction matters. A delayed turbine can mean delayed power capacity; delayed power capacity can mean an unfinished data-center buildout. The cost of missing that chain may dwarf the earnings multiple attached to a casting supplier.
The Numbers Back Up the Frustration
The company has not exactly been limping along. Third-quarter revenue climbed 39% to $308 million, while adjusted EBITDA rose 56% to $58 million. Management raised its 2026 outlook to $1.115 billion to $1.130 billion in revenue and $204 million to $207 million of adjusted EBITDA. It also introduced 2027 guidance calling for roughly 22% EBITDA growth, announced an accretive acquisition, and landed additional long-term contracts. Frankly, this is why the timing feels awkward and sensible at the same time. Doncasters only listed on the NYSE in June, and management appears to be executing. Yet this is precisely when an acquirer might pay up: the operating story is visible, the public-company preparation is done, and the supply squeeze is getting harder to ignore.
More than 70% of revenue is under long-term agreements, according to the letter. Five strategic customer partnerships are expected to contribute over $300 million in annual revenue at accretive margins. One ten-year deal has a gas-turbine OEM funding about 80% of a capacity expansion costing more than $200 million. That is a serious signal. Customers generally do not bankroll supplier expansion because they are feeling relaxed about available capacity.
Margins and Aftermarket Demand Are the Real Prize
Mudrick says the market may be missing the aftermarket, margin runway, and defense opportunity. The heavy-frame gas turbine installed base is projected by management to grow from roughly 140 gigawatts to 350–400 gigawatts by 2035. Every added machine expands the eventual need for replacement blades and vanes. Traditional power demand supports that case, while data-center power requirements could provide more upside. Nobody should treat an investor letter's projections as gospel, but the industrial logic is hard to dismiss: installed equipment creates recurring service needs, and qualified replacement parts have a different economic character than one-off production.
Adjusted EBITDA margin reached 18.9% in the latest quarter, while the core Engine Products segment posted 23.8%. Mudrick believes margins of 30% or more are achievable over time. That is ambitious, and it deserves healthy skepticism; supply-chain businesses can find fresh ways to disappoint when volume, mix, labor, or input costs turn sour. But the presence of long-term contracts, scarce capacity, and a richer aftermarket gives the claim some bones. The initial defense contract for superalloy and microturbine castings used in unmanned aerial systems adds another potentially higher-margin outlet without requiring Doncasters to reinvent its factory footprint.
A Sale Process Is Not the Same as Surrender
Mudrick estimates Doncasters trades at around 15 times 2027 EBITDA. It contrasts that with GE Aerospace's September agreement to acquire Consolidated Precision Products for $11.75 billion, which Mudrick estimates represented roughly 36 times 2027 EBITDA on a clean basis. Those are not interchangeable assets, and transaction multiples can get distorted by accounting, synergies, and deal-specific facts. Anybody waving the 36-times figure around as an automatic price target is getting ahead of themselves. Still, GE's move validates the broader point that casting capacity has become strategic infrastructure, not just another supplier category.
“If no compelling offer emerges, shareholders lose nothing, and management's excellent standalone plan continues,” Mudrick argues.
That is mostly right, with one caveat: a process can distract people and create expectations. Mudrick sensibly recommends narrow outreach to a select group rather than a noisy auction. The board should test the thesis, keep management focused, and demand a premium that reflects both present performance and the value of supply security. If bidders blink, Doncasters still has a growing order book, expanding capacity, and a credible standalone path. If a buyer does not blink, shareholders should want the board ready with a very sharp pencil.